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REINING IN THE DATA TRADERS: A TORT FOR THE MISUSE
OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
SARAH LUDINGTON*
In 2005, three spectacular data security breaches focused public
attention on the vast databases of personal information held by data
traders such as ChoicePoint and LexisNexis, and the vulnerability of
that data.  The personal information of hundreds of thousands of
people had either been hacked or sold to identity thieves, yet the data
traders refused to reveal to those people the specifics of the informa-
tion sold or stolen. While Congress and many state legislatures
swiftly introduced bills to force data traders to be more accountable to
their data subjects, fewer states actually enacted laws, and none of
the federal bills were taken to a vote before the election in 2006.  In
large part, individuals remain powerless to discover the information
a data trader holds about them, to discover what information was
sold or stolen, to prevent data traders from using their personal infor-
mation in unauthorized ways, or to hold data traders accountable
for lax security.
The Article argues that a new common law tort should be used
to force reform and accountability on data traders, and to provide
remedies for individuals who have suffered harm to their core privacy
interests of choice and control—choice about who may receive their
information, control over the information revealed, and how the re-
cipient of that information may use it.  The Article examines the
current legislative and common law regimes, concluding that there
are no effective remedies for individuals who have suffered harm
from data misuse.  Given the ineffective legislative response to the
security breaches of 2005, the Article argues that the existing scheme
of common law privacy torts should be expanded to create a new tort
for information misuse.  The new tort borrows from existing privacy
torts—in particular, the tort of appropriation—and existing privacy
statutes, importing the Fair Information Practices from the Privacy
Act of 1974 as a standard of care.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A woman receives frightening letters and telephone calls from a
parolee who learned her address and telephone number while
processing insurance data in prison.  A law student discovers that
someone obtained his student loan data and used it to apply for and
max out a credit card.  A man purchases classical music CDs from an
Internet retailer and starts to receive unwanted e-mail solicitations
from vendors selling similar music.  A woman fortuitously discovers
that a data broker has included her personal information on a direct
marketing list entitled “waist-watcher-status-spender.”
This Article begins with the premise that individuals should have
available remedies for the types of information misuse described in
the first paragraph, but under the current system of privacy regula-
tion—including industry self-regulation, legislation, and common law
remedies—none of these victims have an easy or obvious claim1
1. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
877 (2003) (discussing the inadequacy of remedies currently available to address privacy
wrongs).
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against the company that collected, sold, rented, exposed, or analyzed
their personal information.2
There are several holes in the current regulatory scheme.  First,
there are no regulations governing most private “data traders.”  For
the purposes of this Article, a “data trader” is any private entity that
collects, stores, processes, sells, rents, or disseminates personal infor-
mation, including, but not limited to, a data broker.  Data traders may
include businesses such as direct marketers, retail establishments, on-
line businesses (including Internet service providers), service indus-
tries (such as travel agents), and data brokers—entities whose sole
business is to collect, analyze, and trade personal information.  For
example, the direct marketing industry is free from government regu-
lation of its data trading practices, with the exception of the Do-Not-
Call list imposed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
in 2003.3  Second, most types of personal information—including
names, birthdates, addresses, telephone numbers, clickstream data,4
travel details (flights, car rentals, hotels, train tickets) and transac-
tional data (who bought what from whom, when, where, and how)—
are unregulated, unless the data trader violates its own privacy policy,
in which case the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can hold the
company accountable for unfair trade practices.  Thus it is currently
legal—in the sense that there is no penalty—for data traders to sell
2. For the purposes of this Article, personal information means any information relat-
ing to an individual, including name, home address, e-mail address, work address, credit
card numbers, Social Security number, transactional data, clickstream data, travel itinera-
ries, any unique identifier associated with personal information in a database, and digital
personality profiles obtained by aggregating, analyzing, or “mining” personal information,
when it is or can be used to uniquely identify, locate, or contact that person.  Personal
information is also commonly called personally identifiable information (PII) or personal
data. See Wikipedia, Personally Identifiable Information, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Personally_identifiable_information (last visited Sept. 29, 2006) (defining “personally iden-
tifiable information” to encompass any information that can be used by a third party to
identify, find, or contact an individual); Center for Democracy and Technology, Privacy
Rules for Access to Personal Data, http://www.cdt.org/security/guidelines (last visited
Sept. 29, 2006) (describing personal information as “personal data”).  I have avoided the
term “private information” because I believe that it is too restrictive, as it could be inter-
preted as information in which one has a subjective and objective expectation of privacy.
3. Press Release, FCC, FCC Authorizes Nationwide Do-Not-Call Registry (June 26,
2003), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235841A1.doc.
4. Clickstream data is
a record of a user’s activity on the Internet, including every Web site and every
page of every Web site that the user visits, how long the user was on a page or site,
in what order the pages were visited, any newsgroups that the user participates in
and even the e-mail addresses of mail that the user sends and receives.  Both ISPs
and individual Web sites are capable of tracking a user’s clickstream.
Webopedia, Clickstream, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/clickstream.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 29, 2006).
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personal information without the consent of the subject, to deny indi-
viduals information about the quantity or categories of lists that con-
tain their information, and to deny any requests to remove personal
information from these lists.5  Even regulated data traders, such as
banks and credit reporting agencies, are permitted to share personal
information with their “affiliates”6 without permission from the af-
fected individuals.7
The problem of information misuse has grown with the data in-
dustry.  Data traders collect, combine, analyze (or “mine”),8 rent, and
sell personal information in astonishing volumes.  There are more
than 1,000 data brokers in the United States,9 the largest of whom
claim to have detailed data profiles of “nearly every American con-
sumer and household,”10 and whose profits exceed $1 billion annu-
ally.11  In 1992, it was estimated that data traders exchanged personal
information every five seconds.12  Since then, rapid advances in the
5. William J. Fenrich, Common Law Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Informa-
tion, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 956 (1996).  Not much has changed since Fenrich wrote his
article, with two exceptions.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) requires financial insti-
tutions to provide notice regarding disclosure of personal information.  15 U.S.C.
§§ 6802–6803 (2000).  The revisions to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) force credit
institutions to disclose consumer reports to individuals.  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(iii).
6. An “affiliate” is “any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with another company.”  12 C.F.R. § 216.3(a) (2006).
7. For example, the FCRA provides that
“[C]onsumer report” does not include . . . any communication of other informa-
tion among persons related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate con-
trol, if it is clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the consumer that the
information may be communicated among such persons and the consumer is
given the opportunity, before the time that the information is initially communi-
cated, to direct that such information not be communicated among such persons.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(iii).  Similarly, the GLBA generally requires only that financial
institutions provide notice to consumers before “directly or through any affiliate, dis-
clos[ing] to a nonafilliated third party any nonpublic personal information.”  15 U.S.C.
§ 6802(a).  The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) per-
mits the sharing of personal information with entities that provide “health care opera-
tions.”  45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2005).  For marketing opportunities, HIPAA requires the
health care provider to obtain consent (an “opt-in”) from an individual before sharing her
information.  45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(3).
8. “Data mining” has been defined as the “process of sifting through large reposito-
ries of data with the goal of discovering patterns, trends, and associations among the data.”
Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 63 (2003).
9. Id. at 65.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 72.
12. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2000).
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technology of data transfer and collection13—cookies14 and spyware,15
to name a few—have undoubtedly caused that rate to increase.  Not
coincidentally, reports of sales of personal information to thieves and
security breaches in data banks have also increased. 16  According to
the FTC, ten million Americans experienced some form of informa-
tion misuse in the year 2002.17  The estimated cost of that misuse to
businesses, mostly financial institutions, was $50 billion.18  In addition,
the average individual paid $500 as a result of the misuse of his infor-
mation and spent thirty hours resolving the problems caused by the
misuse. 19
Among academics, the debate about protecting personal infor-
mation has mostly focused on the pros and cons of creating an indi-
vidual property right in personal information.20  This debate, when
13. McClurg, supra note 8, at 85–87 (describing new technology designed to allow dis- R
parate companies to exchange personal information more easily).
14. A “Web cookie” or “HTTP cookie” is text exchanged between a server and a user’s
web browser every time the user accesses that server.  Wikipedia, HTTP cookie, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cookie_%28computer%29 (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
15. The term “spyware” includes any software that records and disseminates informa-
tion about a user’s computer activity without that user’s knowledge.  Wikipedia, Spyware,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spyware (last visited Sept. 30, 2006).
16. R. Bradley McMahon, After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and GLBA Privacy
Provisions, Why Is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 625, 625
(2004).
17. SYNOVATE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION—IDENTITY THEFT SURVEY REPORT 13 (2003),
http://www.ftc.gov./os/2003/09/synovatereport [hereinafter SYNOVATE REPORT].  These
information misuses occurred when perpetrators opened new credit accounts; acquired
new loans; substituted the victim’s name and identifying information when responding to a
criminal investigation, renting an apartment, or obtaining medical care; misused victims’
existing credit cards; and misused victims’ existing checking, savings, or telephone ac-
counts. Id. at 4.
18. Id. at 6.  The Synovate Report does not allocate the costs of information abuse among
different types of businesses, but the types of misuses described in the Synovate Report are
primarily connected with financial institutions. Id. at 4–7.
19. Id. at 6; see also The Story: “Who Am I?” (American Public Media radio broadcast, Oct.
2, 2006) (audio file available at http://the story.org/archive/the_story_79_Who_Am_I.
mp3/mediafile_view) (chronicling the Sisyphean efforts of one woman to cope with the
emotional and financial havoc wreaked by identity theft).
20. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1428–36 (2000) (proposing legislation that creates a limited prop-
erty right of informational privacy); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2056, 2056, 2094 (2004) (developing a model of “propertized personal
information” that (1) limits alienability of personal information; (2) establish opt-in de-
fault rules; (3) creates a right to rescind data trade agreements; (4) confers liquidated
damages to successful litigants to effectively deter violations; and (5) defines institutional
roles in regulating the information market); Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A
Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 368–82 (proposing a regulatory
model for privacy protection that emphasizes individuals’ control over their personal
information).
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not mired in formalist notions of privacy,21 has proposed some inno-
vative protections for information privacy.  However, all rely on a legis-
lative agenda to create and enforce a property regime in personal
information.22  Regrettably, the legislative will to construct such a re-
gime does not exist, as the data breaches of 2005—and the lack of a
comprehensive legislative response—made painfully clear.23
In the absence of effective legislation, the common law currently
offers few remedies to individuals whose data are misused.  Contract
solutions have failed because it is difficult for consumers to police the
privacy agreements of the companies with which they do business, if
those companies have privacy agreements at all.24  Scholars who have
considered a tort remedy for information misuse have mostly con-
cluded that the existing scheme of privacy torts is inadequate.25  An-
drew McClurg has argued for the usefulness of tort law in addressing
the misuse of personal information. 26  But, like many scholars who
advocate a property regime, he focuses on the nonconsensual collec-
tion or selling of information, hoping that tort liability will “deter non-
consensual data profiling,”27 without considering remedies that
address the way data traders analyze, use, and misuse the information
21. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 20, at 2095 (questioning whether information prop- R
erty should be viewed as a bundle of sticks or as an exclusivity axiom).
22. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 20, at 1377 (endorsing legislative efforts to protect pri- R
vate information); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 2119 (same); Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note R
20, at 358 (proposing legislation for privacy protection); see also Jerry Kang, Information R
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1287–94 (1998) (proposing legisla-
tion for cyberspace privacy protection, without defining information privacy as a property
right).
23. See infra Part III.
24. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implica-
tions of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057–62 (2000)
(discussing the limitations of using contract law to protect private information); see also
Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 25–32, 38–39 (1995) (explaining why contract law rarely provides an effec-
tive remedy for dissemination of personal information).
25. See, e.g., Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE
NEW LANDSCAPE 193, 209–11 (Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (asserting that
tort remedies do not adequately redress privacy invasions advanced by newly developed
technologies); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1510
(2000) (discussing the constitutional and practical limits to using tort law to regulate inva-
sive new technologies); McClurg, supra note 8, at 97 (noting scholars’ pervasive disbelief R
that tort law could practically regulate data trading); James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal
Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REV. 1, 29–32 (2003) (asserting that tort law was
not designed to address modern technological invasions of privacy and is an ineffective
tool to prevent or redress injuries resulting from data trading).
26. See generally McClurg, supra note 8 (advocating use of the tort of appropriation to R
deter invasive data trading practices).
27. Id. at 101. But see generally Tal Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implemen-
tation-Based Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and the
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR103.txt unknown Seq: 7  5-DEC-06 13:06
146 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:140
that they have collected with the data subject’s permission, or that is
available for use in public records.28
This Article suggests that a new common law tort could be used
to provide remedies to people harmed by common types of data mis-
use, as suggested by the four hypotheticals in the first paragraph: inse-
cure data practices—such as allowing felons to process personal
information, or releasing personal information data to identity
thieves—and the use of personal information data for purposes extra-
neous to the original transaction—such as renting it to a vendor of
related products, or mining it to create a consumer profile or direct
marketing list.  Tort liability for data misuse would provide incentives
for data traders—the entities who are in the best position to prevent
the harms of data misuse—to discover, and honor, the privacy choices
of individuals.  While a legislative solution is ultimately preferable, a
tort solution is a time-honored fix for harms that the legislative pro-
cess has manifestly failed to address.
The new tort, when placed in the context of existing privacy torts
and statutory schemes, is less of a new tort than a cautious expansion
of the old torts into areas created by the technological revolution of
the past century.  Like the appropriation tort, the new tort remedies
the harm to an individual caused by his loss of control over his iden-
tity.  Like the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act),29 the new tort uses the
four principles of Fair Information Practices—notice, choice, access,
and security 30—as the minimum standard for acceptable data man-
agement.  The tort charts new ground in expanding the definition of
what is considered private, in targeting commercial uses of data, and
in transferring the principles of Fair Information Practices from the
public sector to the private sector.
Part II of this Article conceptualizes and defines the harm caused
by information misuse.  Part III examines the limitations and failures
of the current legislative regime, focusing in particular on the ineffec-
tive legislative response to information privacy breaches in 2005.  Part
IV explores in detail the current scheme of privacy torts, and why it is
ill-equipped to address information misuse.  Part V proposes the new
cause of action and outlines its elements.  Part VI concludes by ad-
Internet Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 13 (2004) (focusing on solutions that address the implemen-
tation stage of the data flow).
28. See Nehf, supra note 25, at 17–19 (describing how the development of vast govern- R
ment databases that are online and open to inspection by the public has aided the direct
marketing industry).
29. Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000 & Supp. 2006).
30. See, e.g., id. § 552a(e) (notice); id. § 552a(b) (choice); id. § 552a(d) (access); id.
§ 552a(e) (security).
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dressing some of the objections and criticisms that may be leveled at
this proposal.
II. THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING THE PROBLEM
One reason that the law has been slow to devise effective reme-
dies for information misuse is that a consensus on the harm it causes
has not yet emerged.  Consider the examples given in the first para-
graph of this Article.  The harms described range from the obvious—
stalking and identity theft—to the abstruse—psychological distress at
the loss of control over the use of one’s information, or humiliation
and loss of dignity at being categorized into demeaning consumer
profiles.  While most people would agree that identity theft and stalk-
ing cause harms that deserve remedies, junk e-mails and demeaning
epithets cause psychological or intangible harms that can more easily
be ignored, ridiculed, or minimized.  Indeed, consumers may view un-
wanted targeted advertising, like the unsolicited advertisements for
classical music CDs, as a necessary annoyance—part of what consum-
ers “pay” for the convenience of online shopping or receiving dis-
counts at the grocery store.
Despite the range of consumer preferences for information pri-
vacy, there is still a coherent theoretical basis for the harm caused by
information abuse.  The harm is properly conceptualized as an injury
to autonomy, as the right of information privacy is defined (somewhat
paradoxically)31 as an individual’s right to control her public image,
including the ability to choose what she reveals and what she keeps
hidden.32  Choice and control are core privacy values, and they are
themes evident in the earliest to the most recent writings on privacy.
Warren and Brandeis, for example, complained about the “unautho-
rized circulation of portraits of private persons,”33 and praised the
common law of copyright, which empowers the individual to control
whether and when “that which is his”—including his letters, drafts, or
31. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1168 (2004) (noting the paradox in American scholars’ depiction of the
right to privacy as a “right to a public image of our own making”).
32. Kang, supra note 22, at 1205 (defining information privacy as “an individual’s claim R
to control the terms under which personal information—information identifiable to the
individual—is acquired, disclosed, and used”).  Kang explicitly adopts the definition of
information privacy developed by the Clinton Administration’s Information Infrastructure
Task Force in 1998, noting that the definition is similar to the one that informed the Code
of Fair Information Practices and the Privacy Act of 1974. Id. at 1205–06 & n.43.
33. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890).
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diaries—“shall be given to the public.”34  Alan Westin identified the
control of one’s public persona as a key aspect of two of his four “func-
tions” of individual privacy.35  “Limited and [p]rotected
[c]ommunication”—an individual’s use of reserve and discretion in
his communications with others—facilitates intimate relationships at
home and work, and sets necessary boundaries in relationships.36
“Personal [a]utonomy”—individual resistance to complete domina-
tion or manipulation by another—depends, in part, on a person’s
“sense that it is he who decides when to ‘go public’” with his privately
incubated ideas or views.37
In a similar vein, Jeffrey Rosen imagines the right of privacy as a
bulwark against the misinterpretations and misjudgments that result
when the most intimate details of a life are unexpectedly, and without
permission, thrown into public view, in a world where “information
can easily be confused with knowledge.”38  More recently, James Whit-
man connected the control theme with the core notions of privacy in
continental Europe:39 the rights to “one’s image, name, and reputa-
tion, and what Germans call the right to informational self-
determination—the right to control the sorts of information disclosed
about oneself.”40
Other writers have conceptualized the harm caused by the misuse
of personal information as drastically dehumanizing and debilitating.
Using metaphors derived from George Orwell and Franz Kafka,41
Daniel Solove decries the creation of digital dossiers—extensive data
profiles constructed through the aggregation and analysis of huge
34. Id. at 199; see also Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 449 (N.Y.
1902) (Gray, J., dissenting).
35. See ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 32 (1970) (identifying four core privacy
functions).
36. Id. at 37–38.
37. Id. at 33–34.
38. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 7–8
(2000).  The fear of mischaracterization resulting from unauthorized dissemination of per-
sonal information may be particularly acute when individuals have little control over data
traders’ activities. See Nehf, supra note 25, at 26–27. R
39. Whitman, supra note 31, at 1167–68. R
40. Id. at 1161 (emphasis and footnote omitted).  Whitman contrasts the European
model with the American model of privacy, which, as expressed in the Fourth Amendment,
is more concerned with freedom from state intrusion. Id. at 1161–62.  While this Article
focuses on private data traders, it is worth noting that data traders obtain much of their
information from public databases, compile that information with consumer data, and
then often sell aggregated data profiles to the government. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL
PERSON 169–70 (2004).  Thus, anti-statist concerns are implicated in reigning in the data
traders, as the private sector is doing with information what the government has forbidden
itself to do.
41. SOLOVE, supra note 40, at 7–9. R
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quantities of personal information, that particularly attempt to infer
tastes, preferences, and habits based on consumer transactions.42  Ac-
cording to Solove,  these dossiers may “foster a state of powerlessness
and vulnerability created by people’s lack of any meaningful form of
participation in the collection and use of their personal informa-
tion.”43  Andrew McClurg similarly argues that a digital dossier “impli-
cates a person’s ‘inner identity’” by attempting to replicate his very
personality.44  By appropriating this inner identity and assigning labels
to it, data traders “steal[ ] something intimate and important that has
been self-constructed,” fundamentally robbing the consumer of the
right to assign his own labels to himself.45
Professors Solove and McClurg may have overstated the harm, as
their theories are belied by both empirical and theoretical objections.
First, their theories ignore those consumers who are willing to trade
their personal information for frequent flier miles, grocery store dis-
counts, or the convenience of one-click shopping.  Either these con-
sumers are ignorant of or willfully blind to the danger of trading their
information, or they instinctively perceive the risk as something less
than a dire affront to their personhoods.
The theoretical basis of this instinct is the disjunction between
what one purchases and one’s perceived inner identity.  Thus, while
what we buy reveals much about who we are, or hope to be, it is also
true that much of the personal data generated by consumer transac-
tions does not reveal the inner identity of the consumer, and that the
aggregation and profiling of this data does not necessarily cause the
consumer to feel powerless and vulnerable.  Granted, my own
purchases reveal my real, perceived, or desired class status; my age,
national, ethnic, religious, or gender identity; my tastes and prefer-
ences; and the hours I keep.  But I equally doubt that someone who
knows all these details knows me intimately or privately.  Purchases of
drugs or medicine get closer; reading and viewing choices draw closer
still.  Accordingly, a digital dossier might come close to describing my
persona or even my personality, but ultimately and ironically, it misses
my inner self: my thoughts, hopes, spirituality, relationships, and per-
42. Id. at 1–2.
43. Id. at 47–48.
44. McClurg, supra note 8, at 124–25. R
45. Id. at 126.
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sonal dignity.  The closer data profiles come, the farther away they
seem, and that irony can be both subversive and empowering.46
Rather than exaggerate the harm of information misuse, this Arti-
cle asserts that information misuse is, at a minimum, an injury to the
individual’s autonomy—or rights of choice and control—which are
indisputably core values of the right to privacy.  An individual whose
personal information has been sold, rented, or analyzed without his
consent experiences injury precisely to his choice and control—
choice over who may receive his information, and control over the
information revealed and how the recipient may use it.
The harm is also usefully viewed as an injury to the individual as
consumer, for whom choice and control are critical values.  In a re-
cent article, Stan Karas defines information privacy as “the protection
of the integrity of the individual self as composed of a multitude of
identities,” including “the individual as a consumer,” and argues that
data use becomes intrusive if it “disclos[es] the subject’s personality as
expressed through his consumer self.”47  Karas connects consumption
habits, self-expression, and identity,48 arguing that an accurate and
comprehensive record of our purchases can produce “a blurry but
strikingly accurate glance” at our expressive, ergo private, selves.49
Connecting Karas’s notion of the privacy of the individual as con-
sumer with the privacy value of autonomy suggests that data use be-
comes harmful if it compromises the choice and control of the
consumer over the use of his personal information.
Viewed as an injury to the individual as consumer, the harm
caused by information misuse looks less like a novel idea and more
like a small part in the grander scheme of consumer injuries.  The law
already protects the individual as consumer with systems such as the
product liability scheme, and comprehensive legislation designed to
mitigate power imbalances between individuals and institutions and to
make consumer credit and banking transactions transparent and fair.
It makes sense, therefore, that the law would protect the individual vis-
a`-vis data traders, mitigating power imbalances and devising a system
to make the trading and use of information more transparent and
fair.
46. See ROSEN, supra note 38, at 9 (“But even if we saw the [clickstream] logs of every- R
thing she had read and downloaded this week, we wouldn’t come close to knowing who
she really is.  (Instead, we would misjudge her in all sorts of new ways.)”).
47. Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 393, 429 (2002).
48. Id. at 424, 427–29.
49. Id. at 398.
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III. THE FAILURE AND LIMITATIONS OF LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES
The current system—if it can be called one—for regulating the
use of personal information by private data traders does so inconsis-
tently and unpredictably.50  Currently, federal legislation regulates the
use of bank records,51 cable TV records,52 credit reports,53 informa-
tion about children collected through the Internet,54 medical infor-
mation,55 educational records,56 “consumer proprietary network
information” (CPNI),57 and video rental records,58 but with varying
degrees of strength and no comprehensive system of oversight.  Addi-
tionally, various states regulate the use of insurance records,59 library
records,60 Social Security numbers,61 and telephone services.62  Still,
individuals whose data have been misused have few viable statutory
remedies.  Many federal privacy statutes do not include provisions that
grant a private right of enforcement,63 or provide such a low level of
liquidated damages that litigating claims is not cost effective.64  Public
enforcement of privacy policies by the FTC and state attorneys gen-
50. Critics use a variety of unflattering epithets to describe the uncoordinated aggrega-
tion of industry self-regulations, and state, federal, and common laws that protect (or fail
to protect) personal information. See, e.g., id. at 401 (“patchwork”); Kurt M. Saunders &
Bruce Zucker, Counteracting Identity Fraud in the Information Age: The Identity Theft and As-
sumption Deterrence Act, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 661, 670 (1999) (“scatter-shot”).
51. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 7–8 (2002).
52. Id. at 9.
53. Id. at 17.
54. Id. at 44.
55. Id. at 50.
56. Id. at 63–64.
57. Id. at 69.  CPNI is information pertaining to telephone services: “information that
relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, destination, location, and amount of
use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer . . . and information
contained in the bills pertaining to telephone exchange service or telephone toll service
received by a customer . . . .”  47 U.S.C. § 222(h)(1) (2000).
58. SMITH, supra note 51, at 44. R
59. Id. at 36–39.
60. Id. at 40–41.
61. Id. at 60–61.
62. Id. at 67–69.
63. E.g., Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000)
(education records); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2000) (unfair
and deceptive trade practices); Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (ID Theft
Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2000 & West Supp. 2006) (identification documents).
64. E.g., Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (granting $1,000 mini-
mum recovery to plaintiffs who bring successful Privacy Act claims).  Victims of identity
theft are not compensated for their losses under the ID Theft Act.  McMahon, supra note
16, at 632. R
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eral65 has failed to reform the data traders or to effectively stem the
incidence of identity theft.66
At the federal level, some of the more effective legislation is lev-
eled at very narrow categories of data, but entire swaths of personal
information are left unprotected.  The haphazard creation of federal
privacy legislation is perhaps best illustrated by the Video Protection
Privacy Act (VPPA),67 which prohibits a video store from releasing lists
of rented or requested videos, except pursuant to legal process.68  Any
person whose information is released can sue in federal court and
receive actual damages (not less than the liquidated sum of $2,500),
punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.69
This (relatively) robust framework for the protection of privacy in
video rental records is the ironic legacy of Judge Robert Bork, whose
video rental records were obtained by and published in City Paper, a
Washington, D.C. weekly, during the course of Judge Bork’s conten-
tious confirmation hearings for a seat on the Supreme Court.70  The
media initially reacted to the list with light-hearted commentary on
the Borks’ taste in movies (the consensus being that it was rather
good).71  A few days later, Senator Alan Simpson criticized City Paper
for its “arrogant, smart-aleck, super-sarcastic, puerile, sorry and pa-
thetic” article,72 and the American Civil Liberties Union and People
for the American Way—groups that actively opposed Judge Bork’s
65. Public enforcement, which typically addresses unfair and deceptive trade practices,
is limited to examining whether a data trader adheres to its own privacy and security poli-
cies.  Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 886–87. R
66. Identity theft is a federal crime and many states have passed laws specifically
criminalizing identity theft.  Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of
Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1246–47 (2003).  Nevertheless, most of these statutes
do not allow for individual remedies. Id. at 1247–48, 1250.
67. VPPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).
68. Id.
69. Id.  The VPPA leaves open a loophole, allowing stores to sell to direct marketers
lists of customer names and addresses, arranged by categories of videos rented (e.g., ro-
mantic comedy, schlocky western), unless a customer has specifically opted-out of this op-
portunity.  Schwartz, supra note 20, at 2099 n.221. R
70. Of a Judge and His VCR, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Sept. 26, 1987.
71. See, e.g., National Editorial Sampler, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Sept. 30, 1987 (reporting
one reviewer’s assessment of the Borks’ taste in movies as “impeccable”); Of a Judge and His
VCR, supra note 70 (highlighting the Borks’ selection of Washington-related movies); Per- R
sonalities, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1987, at C3 (noting the Borks’ preference for British mov-
ies and Cary Grant films).
72. In the News, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 29, 1987.  The Washington Post was quick
to mock politicians, including Senator Simpson, who expressed anger over the release of
Bork’s video rental records.  Editorial, Invasion of Video Privacy, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 1987,
at A18 (satirizing Judge Bork’s video rental disclosure).
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nomination73—jumped into the debate on the side of the judge and
his right to keep his video rental records private.74
Thus were spawned the “son of Bork” bills—state and federal leg-
islation that prohibited the release of video rental records.75  But the
Bork bill failed to engender similarly strong legislation to protect indi-
viduals against the misuse of other forms of personal information.
Thus, while my video rental store may not release my rental records, a
retail vendor of videos could sell or rent a list of my purchases, as can
vendors of books, music CDs, or DVDs.
The haphazard legislative coverage of personal information can
be viewed as a history of effective lobbying by the direct marketing
industry, which has actively worked against government regulation of
data trading.  Almost thirty years ago, as a way of fending off legisla-
tively forced reform, lobbying groups for data traders—including one
of the key players, the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) (formerly
Direct Mail Marketing Association)76—pledged to the Privacy Protec-
tion Study Commission that it would regulate itself.77  To fulfill its ob-
ligation, the DMA operated mail78 and telephone preference services,
which allowed consumers to opt-out of direct marketing.79  The regis-
tries were largely ineffective because they were burdensome—con-
sumers had to either write a letter to register, or pay a fee to be
73. Stephen Advokat, Publication of Bork’s Video Rentals Raises Privacy Issue, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 20, 1987, at 106.
74. Id.
75. See Private Screenings, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 1988, at 31 (describing pending state
bans on video rental records release); Washington News, UNITED PRESS INT’L, May 10, 1988
(describing congressional efforts to outlaw disclosure of video rental and library records).
76. Ecommerce Topics, Junkbusters, http://www.junkbusters.com/ecommerce.html
(last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
77. The Privacy Protection Study Commission ultimately concluded that
[i]n the private sector, the Commission specifies voluntary compliance . . . if the
organizations in an industry have shown themselves willing to cooperate volunta-
rily.  In its mailing list recommendations for example, the Commission specifies
that when an organization has a practice of renting, lending, or exchanging the
names of its customers, members, or donors for use by others in a direct mail
marketing or solicitation, it should inform each of them that it does so and give
each an opportunity to veto the practice with respect to his own name.  The Com-
mission does not call for legislation to enforce compliance with this recommenda-
tion because it has reason to believe the industry is willing to accept these
restrictions voluntarily, and there are no legal impediments to stop it from doing
so.
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 34
(1977); see also id. at 150–51 (stating the Commission’s belief that voluntary industry re-
form would successfully address problems of inadequate consumer notice).
78. Id. at 141–42, 144–46.
79. CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., PRIVACY SELF REGULATION: A DEC-
ADE OF DISAPPOINTMENT 1 (2005), http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.html.
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registered by telephone—and consumers were only protected against
solicitations from marketers who were DMA members.80
In the 1990s, data traders again fended off direct regulation, but
this time from the FTC in the area of online commerce.  The FTC
issued a report to Congress in 1998, concluding that commercial Web
sites were not effectively regulating privacy on the Internet, but rec-
ommending against legislation because industry leaders had pledged
“their commitment to work toward self-regulatory solutions.”81  A year
later, the FTC concluded that there had been “important develop-
ments” in industry self-regulation, and so again recommended against
legislation.82  The FTC has not revisited the issue, and the seven-year
period of industry self-regulation has coincided with the Internet
boom, and with it the rapidly expanding possibilities for electronic
surveillance, data collection, combining, mining, and direct
marketing.83
The results of self-regulation have been disappointing from the
perspective of information privacy advocates, who have called it a fail-
ure and implored Congress and the FTC to disavow data industry self-
regulation of privacy.84  Citing the DMA telephone preference service
as an example, critics noted that the DMA registered only 4.8 million
consumers in the seventeen years it operated a telephone preference
service; the FTC registered 10 million consumers on the first day of
the Do-Not-Call list.85
Three spectacular private-sector security breaches in 2005—and
the legislative responses to them—show that the data industry is still
capable of fending off direct government regulation.86
In February 2005, ChoicePoint revealed to thousands of Califor-
nians that it had sold their personal information, including “names,
80. Id. at 2.
81. FTC, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (1999),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/privacy99.pdf.
82. Id. at 1, 12.  These developments included the release of Online Privacy Guidelines
by the Online Privacy Alliance, a conglomerate of industry organizations, and the emer-
gence of “seal” programs that monitor privacy policy compliance such as TRUSTe, BBBOn-
Line, and CPA WebTrust. Id. at 8–12.
83. Scholars have described the data industry and invasive technologies in great detail
and depth. See Froomkin, supra note 25, at 1468–1501 (describing and evaluating a variety R
of “privacy-destroying technologies”); McClurg, supra note 8, at 71–87 (explaining the op- R
eration of the “consumer profiling industry”); Schwartz, supra note 20, at 2060–69 (exam- R
ining technologies that commercialize personal information).
84. E.g., HOOFNAGLE, supra note 79, at 1. R
85. Id. at 2.
86. For a complete list of data breaches reported since early 2005, see Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches Since the ChoicePoint Incident, http://
privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2006).
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addresses, Social Security numbers, [and] credit reports,” to a ring of
identity thieves who had registered fake companies—using previously
stolen identities—for the purpose of purchasing personal informa-
tion.87  ChoicePoint eventually revealed that it sold the personal data
of more than 163,000 people, but refused to specify to the affected
consumers exactly what data it had sold.88
Shortly thereafter, Bank of America announced that tapes con-
taining the financial data of 1.2 million government employees, in-
cluding Social Security numbers, were either lost or stolen from an
airplane while being shipped to a backup data center.89
In March 2005, LexisNexis announced that criminals may have
accessed the personal information of 32,000 people, including names,
addresses, and Social Security and driver’s license numbers, through
its subsidiary, Seisint.90  After completing its security review, Lexis-
Nexis increased its estimate, concluding that criminals had accessed
the personal information of 310,000 people in fifty-nine separate inci-
dents of security breaches.91
The legislative response to these revelations was swift: data secur-
ity legislation was introduced in at least thirty-one state legislatures
and both houses of Congress.92  Despite this promising start, few of
the bills were enacted, and those that were enacted tend to focus spe-
87. Bob Sullivan, Database Giant Gives Access to Fake Firms, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 14, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6969799.  At the time, California was the only state that
required data brokers to reveal security breaches. Id.
88. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, EPIC ChoicePoint Page, http://
www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/default.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006) (describing one
victim’s inability to procure from ChoicePoint the same personal information that the
company had sold to criminals).  The FTC charged ChoicePoint with violations of the
FCRA and section five of the Fair Trade Commission Act because of false and misleading
statements on its Web site regarding its security procedures.  Complaint at 7–11, United
States v. ChoicePoint Inc., No. 1 06–CV–0198 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2006), http://
www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf.  ChoicePoint settled with the
FTC concurrently with the filing of the complaint.  Press Release, FTC, ChoicePoint Settles
Data Security Breach Charges (Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/
choicepoint.htm.
89. CBS News, Bank of America Security Lapse, Feb. 25, 2005, http://www.cb-
snews.com/stories/2005/02/25/tech/main676662.shtml.
90. Press Release, Reed Elsevier, LexisNexis Investigates Compromised Customer IDs
and Passwords to Seisint US Consumer Data, Mar. 9, 2005, http://www.reed-elsevier.com/
index.cfm?articleid=1258.
91. Press Release, LexisNexis, LexisNexis Concludes Review of Data Search Activity,
Identifying Additional Instances of Illegal Data Access, Apr. 12, 2005, http://
www.lexisnexis.com/about/releases/0789.asp.
92. See The State PIRG Consumer Protection Inside Pages, State Breach and Freeze
Laws, http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2006)
[hereinafter State PIRG Pages]; see also infra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. R
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cifically on financial and other data found on credit reports, rather
than on consumer data more generally.93
The state bills generally proposed three ways to “protect” con-
sumers from data security breaches: consumer notification following a
security breach, consumer-initiated security freezes on credit reports,
and consumer access to credit reports.  Notification provisions gener-
ally require a data broker to notify an individual when his personal
information may have been stolen.94  Security freezes allow individuals
to prevent credit reporting agencies from releasing their credit report
without express permission.  The security freezes are designed to be
consumer friendly, implemented by a written notice or a telephone
call to the credit agency.95  A few bills were proposed allowing con-
sumers to access their data files, obtain a list of everyone who had
received the file in the past year, dispute the accuracy of their data,
and file a civil action for damages.96
Numerous bills dealing with data security were introduced in the
United States House and Senate in the spring of 2005.  Many of them
included notification requirements,97 security freezes,98 and access for
individuals to their data files.99  Various bills called for increased FTC
oversight and regulation of data brokers100 and further restrictions on
the legal uses of Social Security numbers.101  Two bills proposed a pri-
93. See, e.g., State PIRG Pages, supra note 92 (summarizing recently enacted state laws R
that allow consumers to place holds on their credit reports).
94. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912 (Supp. 2006) (requiring information brokers to
provide notice of any security breach of databases containing personal information to any
affected state residents).
95. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-63 (2005) (permitting a consumer to impose a security
freeze on his credit report through a written request to a consumer reporting agency); S.
879, 2005 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2005) (same).
96. E.g., S.B. 149, 24th Leg., 1st Sess. §§ 45.48.070, 45.48.190 (Alaska 2005), available at
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_bill_text.asp?hsid=SB0149C&session=24 (providing
private right of action against violators of notice and freeze provisions); S.B. 506, 93rd Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 407.1421 (Mo. 2005), available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/
05info/billtext/intro/SB506.htm (requiring disclosure of consumer report contents to the
consumer upon request, providing the right to dispute inaccurate information, and al-
lowing a civil suit against parties who misuse personal data).  One state—Rhode Island—
has proposed a statute that gives consumers the right to know what types of personal infor-
mation a data trader has disclosed to third parties for direct marketing purposes.  S.B.
2225, 2006 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2006).
97. E.g., S. 1789, 109th Cong. § 421 (2005); S. 1408, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005); H.R.
3140, 109th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2005); S. 1336, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005); S. 751, 109th Cong. § 3
(2005); S. 768, 109th Cong. § 8 (2005); H.R. 1069, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
98. E.g., S. 1408 § 4; S. 1336 § 2.
99. E.g., S. 1789 § 301; S. 500, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
100. S. 1408 § 2; H.R. 3140 § 2; S. 768 § 3; S. 500 § 3; H.R. 1069 § 7.
101. S. 1408 § 8; H.R. 1745, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1078, 109th Cong. (2005).
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vate right of action for individuals.102  Several bills specified that fed-
eral legislation would preempt any state laws governing data
brokers,103 which prompted criticism from privacy advocates that the
weaker federal legislation would dismantle the stronger efforts of
states like California to protect the privacy of their citizens.104  After
making a quick start, all of the bills were mired down in committees
by turf wars and intense lobbying.105  None became law in 2005, and
although some of the bills have emerged from committees, none were
passed before the election in 2006.106
The state legislation was more successful than the federal, with
notification provisions faring best.  Before the ChoicePoint scandal,
only California required data brokers to notify individuals of security
breaches.107  By mid-2006, thirty-three states had passed laws requiring
notification to consumers of data security breaches,108 but similar leg-
islation failed to pass in thirteen additional states (including a propo-
sal in California to strengthen existing law).109  By mid-2006, security
102. S. 1336 § 10; S. 500 § 4.
103. S. 2169, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005); S. 1789 § 303;
S. 1408 § 7.
104. Letter from Jeff Chester et al., Executive Director, Center for Digital Democracy, to
Sen. Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), Senate Committee on the Judi-
ciary (Nov. 9, 2005), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/datamarker11.
09.05.html.
105. Elana Schor, Data-protection Turf War Pleases Lobbyists, THE HILL, Aug. 17, 2005, at
11, available at http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/Business/081705_data.
html.
106. E.g., H.R. 3997 (approved by Committee on Energy and Commerce on June 2,
2006 and referred to Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union); S. 1408
(calendared on Dec. 8, 2005); S. 1789 (calendared on Nov. 17, 2005).  On June 16, 2006,
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton announced plans to introduce a comprehensive privacy
bill, called the Privacy Rights and Oversight for Electronic and Commercial Transactions
Act of 2006 (PROTECT Act).  Press Release, Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, Senator
Clinton Calls for New Privacy Bill of Rights to Protect Americans’ Personal Information
(June 16, 2006), http://clinton.senate.gov/news/statements/details.cfm?id=257234&&.
The Act would require data brokers to seek consumer permission for data sharing (“opt-
in”); create a private cause of action for consumers with tiered statutory-minimum dam-
ages ranging from $1,000 to $5,000; give consumers the right to access their own data
records, protect their telephone records, freeze their credit reports, and receive notifica-
tion of security breaches; and create a “privacy czar” at the Office of Management and
Budget to oversee privacy practices in the federal government. Id.
107. Sullivan, supra note 87. R
108. These states include Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Minne-
sota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin.  State PIRG Pages, supra note 92. R
109. Despite having the strongest data privacy laws in the country, the proposals in Cali-
fornia to strengthen existing laws fizzled in 2005, showing that lobbying efforts by data
traders remain intense and effective in that state. See Insurance Brokers & Agents of the
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freezes were enacted in a total of twenty-five states,110 but were de-
bated and foundered in ten more states (including proposals in Cali-
fornia and Texas to strengthen existing laws).111  Five states—
Colorado, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Rhode Island—
enacted legislation that creates a private cause of action for consumers
when data traders violate their freeze or notice obligations.112
In sum, the results of the state and federal legislative efforts of
2005 provide few remedies to privacy-conscious individuals who are
injured by unfair or insecure data practices.  First, the notification re-
quirements are post facto; they do not help individuals prevent unau-
thorized access to their data files, and the requirements only apply
after a third party gains unauthorized access to data.  Thus, notifica-
tion provides no help for the individual who wants to preemptively
control the sale or renting of his data to a third party.  Similarly, the
security freeze, which allows an individual to control the release of his
credit report, does not help the individual who wants to prevent the
downstream sale of his nonfinancial personal information—such as
transactional or travel data not typically contained in a credit report.
Further, the notification and security laws do not allow individuals to
access their data files so that they can see what information was re-
leased and to whom.  Finally, no state passed a law that allows individ-
uals to sue data traders for the injury to their interest in controlling
the uses of their personal information.
West, SB 550 Negotiations Resume, http://www.ibawest.com/cgi-bin/beta.asp?SecID=675
&ID=8619 (last visited Oct. 7, 2006) (discussing failure of data broker reform legislation to
emerge from committee due to financial industry pressure).  In 2002, data traders spent
more than $20 million in campaign contributions and lobbying expenses to oppose a con-
sumer financial privacy bill in California.  Bill Wallace, $20 Million Tab to Defeat Privacy Bill;
Among Priciest Lobbying Efforts in State History, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 7, 2002, at A1.  In 1996,
California considered legislation that prohibited data brokers from using or distributing
for profit personal information, without that person’s written consent.  Fenrich, supra note
5, at 986 & n.236.  However, the bill was killed by a compromise, due to pressure from the R
credit reporting agency industry lobby. Id. at 987–88.
110. These states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin.  State PIRG Pages, supra note 92. R
111. Id.
112. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-14.3-106.6, -106.7, -107 (West Supp. 2005); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51:3075 (Supp. 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:11-46(i)(1), -50 (West Supp.
2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-63 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-48-7 (Supp. 2006) (effective Jan.
1, 2007).
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IV. THE EXISTING SCHEME OF PRIVACY TORTS
To suggest that the existing scheme of privacy torts would be an
effective tool for addressing the complex problems of personal infor-
mation abuse is akin to suggesting that one could use a toy drill to fix
a nuclear reactor.  The tool is clumsy and poorly designed; it does not
really fit the parts that are broken; it tends to fall apart when put
under pressure; and this particular tool may be running out of batter-
ies just as the situation is getting dire.113  Manifestly, it is not the right
tool for the job.  However, in the absence of other solutions, it may be
the only tool available, and so it is worth exploring exactly what repair
might be done with it.
Privacy torts are typically divided into four categories: intrusion
upon seclusion, publication of private facts, publicity that places the
plaintiff in a false light, and appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or
likeness (often known as or conflated with the right of publicity
tort).114  None of these torts comfortably addresses the misuse of per-
sonal information, although all have the potential to address certain
aspects of data misuse.
A. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion provides a remedy against
someone who “intrudes, physically or otherwise,” in a way that would
be “highly offensive to a reasonable person,” upon the plaintiff’s “soli-
tude or seclusion” or “private affairs or concerns.”115  The textbook
intrusion tort involves a peeping tom’s gaze; a reporter or paparazzo’s
aggressive or surreptitious pursuit of his targets;116 or a spy’s use of
surveillance methods to observe someone in a place where he has a
113. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Bran-
deis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 362–63 (1983) (discussing the inadequacy of
common law tort in light of technological developments).
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977) (setting forth the bases for an
invasion of privacy cause of action); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389
(1960) (describing the four types of privacy invasion torts).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
116. See, e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 247–48 (9th Cir. 1971) (affirming
recovery for invasion of privacy when defendant reporter surreptitiously photographed
and recorded plaintiff in his home); Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 69 (Cal.
1999) (holding that defendant reporter’s use of a hidden camera in an office environment
satisfied the elements of the intrusion tort); Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668,
670, 678–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that surviving wife stated an intrusion claim
when camera crew followed paramedics into her home and filmed efforts to save her hus-
band); Mitchell v. Balt. Sun Co., 883 A.2d 1008, 1019 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (finding a
triable issue of fact on an intrusion claim when reporters entered a nursing home room
without permission and refused to leave when asked).
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reasonable expectation of privacy,117 such as a home or bathroom
stall.  The privacy requirement is both subjective and objective; the
plaintiff must actually expect privacy, and his expectation of privacy
must be objectively reasonable.118
As designed, this tort does not address the problems caused by
the misuse of information that is already in the possession of the data
trader.  First, unless the data trader surreptitiously acquired the infor-
mation (through the use of surveillance or spy ware, for example), the
plaintiff cannot show that the trader trespassed or intruded.119  In
Dwyer v. American Express Co.,120 a class of plaintiffs unsuccessfully sued
American Express, claiming that its practice of renting lists of card
holders’ names, organized by purchasing habits, to direct marketers
was an intrusion upon their seclusion.121  This claim foundered on the
requirement that the intrusion be unauthorized.122  The court rea-
soned that
[b]y using the American Express card, a cardholder is volun-
tarily, and necessarily, giving information to defendants that,
if analyzed, will reveal a cardholder’s spending habits and
shopping preferences.  We cannot hold that a defendant has
117. See, e.g., Schuchart v. La Taberna del Alabardero, Inc., 365 F.3d 33, 36 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (noting that liability for intrusion upon seclusion lies when a defendant “offensively
prie[s] into a plaintiff’s zone of privacy,” including peeping through windows); Doe 2 v.
Associated Press, 331 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that liability for the tort of
intrusion requires actions such as watching or spying in an area in which a person expects
to be free from surveillance); Schuler v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 989 F. Supp. 1377, 1390
(D.N.M. 1997) (citing peeping into a private residence as an example of the intrusion
tort); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 239–40, 242 (N.H. 1964) (holding that mar-
ried couple’s allegations that landlord installed a listening device in their bedroom stated a
claim for intrusion upon seclusion).
118. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc. 955 P.2d 469, 490-92 (Cal. 1998) (finding
triable issues of fact whether plaintiff had objectively reasonable expectations of privacy in
the interior of a rescue helicopter, and in conversations with a medic at the accident
scene); Int’l Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187, 191 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (finding no reason-
able expectation of privacy in plaintiff’s attendance at a union meeting); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (noting that the defendant is liable only for intruding
into a “private place” or a “private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person
or affairs”).
119. See Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 422 (holding that the tort of intrusion requires actions such as
“watching, spying, prying, besetting, [or] overhearing” (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213, 1217–18 (D.C. 1989) (listing
examples of intrusion, including spying, reading another’s mail, eavesdropping, and tres-
passing); Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 532–33 (Or. 1985) (finding no
intrusion when a doctor revealed information on a confidential adoption form in his pos-
session because he did not “pry into any personal facts that he did not [already] know”).
120. 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
121. Id. at 1352–54.
122. Id. at 1354.
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committed an unauthorized intrusion by compiling the in-
formation voluntarily given to it and then renting its
compilation.123
Second, as Dwyer suggests, it may be difficult for an individual to
prove that she has a subjective or objective expectation of privacy in
information such as her name, birth date, address, and telephone
number, or records of clickstream data, travel itineraries, grocery
purchases and other transactional data, especially if she has willingly
surrendered that information in exchange for some proffered advan-
tage.124  Most individuals routinely provide identifying information
(such as name, address, telephone number, and birth date) when
asked—online or offline—suggesting that they do not consider this
information private in the same way that they might consider their
medical data private.  Because travel and offline purchases take place
in public, a plaintiff would struggle to establish both subjective and
objective expectations of privacy in this information.  A plaintiff could
probably establish a subjective expectation of privacy in clickstream
data, especially if she has accessed the Internet from her home, but
sustaining a reasonable expectation argument would be more diffi-
cult, as few people are so naı¨ve anymore as to expect anonymity on
the Web.
Even people who fiercely guard their identities will be hard
pressed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
names.  During a Terry stop,125 for example, a police officer can de-
mand a name from the suspect without offending the Fourth Amend-
ment,126 suggesting that there is little, if any, reasonable expectation
of privacy in one’s name.127
If, on the other hand, a plaintiff can argue that the data trader
has used her name, address, and birth date in combination with other
more sensitive information, she might be able to show an expectation
of privacy.  In Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.,128 a Massachusetts superior
court refused to grant summary judgment to a defendant drugstore
when the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s direct marketing
123. Id.
124. See id. (emphasizing that plaintiffs voluntarily gave defendant access to the spend-
ing habit data at issue in the lawsuit).
125. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that a police officer may constitution-
ally stop and frisk a suspect upon reasonable suspicion that the suspect poses a safety
threat).
126. Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 185 (2004).
127. See id. at 191 (opining that “[o]ne’s identity is, by definition, unique; yet it is, in
another sense, a universal characteristic”).
128. No. Civ. A. 98-0897F, 1999 WL 494114 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 29, 1999).
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scheme invaded their privacy.129  Without consent, CVS Pharmacy,
Inc. (CVS) “mined” its customer prescription records for the purpose
of sending its customers mailings targeted to their specific medical
conditions, based on prescriptions they had previously filled.130  CVS
then gave the names, addresses, and birth dates—but no other sensi-
tive medical information—to a direct marketer who prepared the
mailings.  CVS received a fee for each mailing from one of various
drug manufacturers.131  CVS argued that the Massachusetts privacy
statute was not violated by the disclosure of names, addresses, and
birth dates.132  The court rejected this approach, noting that the
plaintiffs had complained about the use of that information “in con-
junction with the systematic searching of customer prescription
records.”133  Consent issues aside, the Weld court’s approach suggests
that a more expansive view of private information—one that incorpo-
rates the ways that information is mined or analyzed—could make this
tort viable for protecting information privacy.
B. Public Disclosure of a Private Fact
The public disclosure tort provides a remedy against someone
who publicizes private information about the plaintiff if the informa-
tion is “not of legitimate concern to the public” and its publication
“would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”134  The tort com-
pensates the plaintiff for the mental distress—shame, humiliation,
and anger—caused by the public display of intimate and embarrassing
information.135  The classic example of a public disclosure tort is the
small town merchant who posts in his shop window, visible to all who
pass by, a true statement that the plaintiff owes him money and has
not repaid him.136  In the past three decades, this tort has been deci-
129. Id. at *1.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *1–2.
132. Id. at *3.
133. Id. at *4.
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
135. See Talley v. Farrell, 156 F. Supp. 2d 534, 544 (D. Md. 2001) (stating that the defen-
dant’s disclosure must be sufficiently offensive to carry “overtones of mental distress” for
plaintiff to recover for unreasonable publicity); Taylor v. NationsBank N.A., 738 A.2d 893,
897 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (same); GEORGE B. TRUBOW, PRIVACY LAW & PRACTICE ¶ 1.05
(1991) (stating that recovery is intended to compensate for mental distress caused by in-
jury to plaintiff’s dignity).
136. Brents v. Morgan, 299 S.W. 967, 968 (Ky. 1927); Prosser, supra note 114, at 392 R
(citing Brents as the first application of the “public disclosure of private facts” tort); see also
Fernandez v. United Acceptance Corp., 610 P.2d 461, 464 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (holding
that plaintiffs’ recovery for invasion of privacy was proper when defendant called plaintiffs’
neighbors and employers in attempt to collect plaintiffs’ debt); Trammell v. Citizens News
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mated by First Amendment limitations on the definition of what is
private and on what information is of legitimate concern to the pub-
lic.137  Hypothetically, however, these First Amendment limitations
would not apply to individual consumer transactions of an embarrass-
ing sort when the individual is not a public figure.  Thus, for example,
an individual would probably avoid the newsworthiness problem if he
sued a data trader who had widely sold the true information that the
plaintiff habitually used his American Express Card to purchase racy
underwear over the Internet at 3:00 A.M.
Plaintiffs who want to use (the remnants of) this tort to redress
the misuse of personal information will face a significant hurdle in
proving that data traders have publicized personal information.  Data
traders typically sell information to other companies (or even govern-
ment agencies), but do not broadcast their information, in the sense
of releasing it for use by the general public.  This type of sale is not
clearly included in the Restatement’s definition of publicity, which re-
quires that the information be communicated to “the public at
large.”138  Thus, for example, the disclosure of embarrassing informa-
tion to a small group of the plaintiff’s coworkers,139 or to a few rela-
Co., 148 S.W.2d 708, 709–10 (Ky. 1941) (holding that newspaper’s publication of plaintiff’s
debt was a public disclosure of private facts sufficient to create a cause of action in tort
against the newspaper); Biederman’s of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892, 893,
898 (Mo. 1959) (holding that plaintiff stated a claim for invasion of privacy when a creditor
loudly demanded payment of plaintiff’s debts at plaintiff’s place of employment).
137. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1975) (invalidating on
First Amendment grounds a state statute that established liability for the broadcast of a
rape victim’s name, when the broadcaster obtained the name from public records).  After
Cox, information contained in a public record that is subject to disclosure under a freedom
of information or sunshine law generally is not considered private.  Furthermore, voluntary
and involuntary public figures generally cannot sue for the publication of truthful informa-
tion, even if the information published exceeds the scope of the figure’s notoriety. E.g.,
Capra v. Thoroughbred Racing Ass’n of N. Am., Inc., 787 F.2d 463, 464–65 (9th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (finding that participants in the federal witness protection program must
prove publication of their real names was not newsworthy for their claim to survive); Virgil
v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 1975) (discussing the exemption from tort
liability for publication of newsworthy personal information). See generally Zimmerman,
supra note 113, 341–62 (discussing the constitutional and practical problems with the pri- R
vate facts tort).
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a.  The Restatement explicitly distin-
guishes the publicity requirement from “publication,” as used in the defamation context,
which requires disclosure only to a third party. Id.
139. Dancy v. Fina Oil & Chem. Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d 737, 738, 740 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (find-
ing that employer’s publication to supervisors, union heads, and other employees, of a list
of employees with excessive absences did not satisfy the publicity element of the invasion of
privacy tort).
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tives and an employer,140 is not considered publicity in most
jurisdictions.  The courts that have deviated from the Restatement have
looked for a “special relationship . . . between the plaintiff and the
‘public’ to whom the information has been disclosed,”141 such that
exposure of those facts to that public—even if constituted of only one
person—would embarrass the plaintiff.142  In the underwear hypo-
thetical, the information about the underwear purchases is most likely
being made available to vendors of similar or related merchandise,
and thus is not likely to embarrass the plaintiff; rather, it might facili-
tate his predilections.  On the other hand, the publicity requirement
might be met if the defendant’s security had been so lax that the in-
formation had effectively been publicized.
Assuming, however, that a plaintiff could top the publicity hur-
dle, there is some promise in using the public disclosure tort to re-
dress the sale of information considered embarrassing, and thus
highly offensive, if disclosed.  While the publication of personal infor-
mation such as names, birthdates, addresses, and telephone numbers
generally fails the highly offensive test,143 it is more likely that the pub-
lication of travel and transactional data could be considered highly
offensive, especially—as in digital dossiers—when the reports are
comprehensive (listing every trip or transaction in the past several
years), or the items purchased (underwear, books, medicines) are
140. See Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 134, 137 (Pa. 1974) (holding that a
creditor’s communication of debt details to the employers and relatives of debtors was not
sufficient publicity to satisfy the requirement).
141. McSurely v. McClellan, 753 F.2d 88, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
142. Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531–32 (Mich. 1977) (holding that the pub-
licity element is satisfied by publication of private information to “a public whose knowl-
edge of those facts would be embarrassing to the plaintiff”), partially overruled on other
grounds by Bradley v. Saranac Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 565 N.W.2d 650 (Mich. 1997).
143. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (emphasizing that rape
victim’s name was a matter of public record in finding no invasion of privacy when a news-
paper published the victim’s name); Meetze v. Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d 606, 610 (S.C.
1956) (finding no invasion of privacy in newspaper’s publication of information that a
twelve-year-old girl gave birth to a healthy child when information was a matter of public
record); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (noting that the tort of invasion of pri-
vacy includes the publicizing of a matter that “would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person”).
There is some indication that the publication of Social Security numbers would be
treated as “highly offensive.” See, e.g., Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash.,
884 P.2d 592, 598 (Wash. 1994) (stating in dicta that “disclosure of a public employee’s
[S]ocial [S]ecurity number would be highly offensive to a reasonable person”). See gener-
ally Lora M. Jennings, Comment, Paying the Price for Privacy: Using the Private Facts Tort to
Control Social Security Number Dissemination and the Risk of Identity Theft, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 725
(2004) (arguing that the publication of Social Security numbers should be considered
highly offensive and remediable under the publication of private facts tort).
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more intimately revealing.144  Despite this possibility, plaintiffs may
struggle to show that the publication of information is highly offensive
in our full-disclosure society.  When people reveal their most embar-
rassing secrets on Maury, The Oprah Winfrey Show, pod casts, and blogs,
or consent to cameras following their most intimate choices and times
of fear and stress, it is difficult to see how the revelation of one’s
purchasing habits could cause a credible emotional injury.
C. False Light
The tort of false light provides a remedy against someone who
publicizes a matter concerning the plaintiff and in so doing portrays
him in a way that is both false and objectionable.145  The interest pro-
tected is the plaintiff’s dignity, and his right to be portrayed as he is
and to avoid being portrayed in an offensively false manner.146  The
typical false light case involves a plaintiff whose photograph, taken in
one context, is later published in a different context that creates a
false and offensive suggestion.147
As with the private facts tort, plaintiffs who want to use false light
to redress the misuse of personal information will face a significant (if
not insurmountable) hurdle in proving that data traders have publi-
cized personal information.148  Assuming, however, that the sale of in-
144. The Restatement leaves open the possibility that publication based on careful or
thorough—rather than casual—observation might qualify as highly offensive. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. on cl. a (stating that casual notice of one’s activities
is to be expected; liability only attaches when a reasonable individual would be “seriously
aggrieved” by the publicity).
145. Id. § 652E.  It is yet undecided whether the defendant must act with reckless disre-
gard for the truth, or whether he can be liable for mere negligence. Id.
146. Id. § 652E cmt. b.  False light is distinct from defamation, which protects the plain-
tiff’s interest in maintaining a good reputation.  False light thus protects a personal inter-
est—what one thinks of oneself, while defamation protects a relational interest—what
others think of one. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984).
147. See, e.g., Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 247, 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that
publication of plaintiff with “Ralph, the Diving Pig” among pornographic photographs in
magazine created actionable disparaging suggestion about plaintiff’s character); Leverton
v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 192 F.2d 974, 977–78 (3d Cir. 1951) (affirming jury award for invasion
of privacy when a publisher used a photograph of a law-abiding, near-victim of an accident
in an unrelated article on the carelessness of pedestrians); Gill v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 239
P.2d 630, 635 (Cal. 1952) (holding that a photograph of a couple captioned as two people
who experienced “love at first sight” connected with an article saying such love is based on
100% sex is sufficient to state a claim for invasion of privacy).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. a (equating the publicity element of
the false light tort with the publicity element of the private facts tort); see also Veilleux v.
Nat’l Broad. Co., 206 F.3d 92, 134 (1st Cir. 2000) (applying Maine law, which follows the
Restatement definition of false light); White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 522
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (citing elements of Restatement definition of false light tort); West v. Media
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formation to other data traders could be considered publicity, this
action could be a useful means of addressing the sale of false informa-
tion that portrays the plaintiff in an objectionable way.  The Restate-
ment explicitly excludes from this tort false information about
insignificant details, such as a person’s correct address, except under
“special circumstances.”149  However, if a data trader transfers suffi-
ciently significant information, such as an inaccurate misdemeanor
conviction, the tort might provide a remedy.  Of course, this tort re-
quires that the resulting portrayal of the plaintiff be false, and so it
entirely misses the misuse of truthful information.  In many cases of
information abuse, the problem is that the information “publicized” is
all too accurate, allowing others to steal or gain unwanted access to
the plaintiff’s identity.
D. Appropriation and the Right of Publicity
The appropriation tort provides a remedy against a defendant
who appropriates the plaintiff’s name or likeness without the plain-
tiff’s permission and uses it for the defendant’s own benefit, usually,
but not necessarily, in a commercial context.150  This tort protects the
plaintiff’s interest in controlling the use of her identity and compen-
sates the mental distress or commercial loss of a person whose name
or image is used without permission.151  The Restatement indicates that
the tort does not protect a person’s name as such, but rather protects
the “values or benefits” of that name, such as the individual’s “pres-
tige, social or commercial standing.”152  Appropriation, which was the
first privacy tort recognized in this country,153 is often conflated with
Gen. Convergence, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 640, 643–45 (Tenn. 2001) (adopting the Restatement
definition of the tort of false light invasion of privacy, including the publicity element).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. c.
150. Id. § 652C cmt. b.
151. Taylor v. City of Demopolis, No. Civ. A. 04-758-BH-B, 2005 WL 3320735, at *12–13
(S.D. Ala. Dec. 6, 2005) (noting that appropriation tort compensates “‘damage to human
dignity’” (quoting Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1446 (11th Cir. 1998));
Fairfield v. Am. Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194, 197–98 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955)
(holding that attorney could recover damages for injury to his peace of mind and feelings
when company used his name in advertisement without permission)); J. THOMAS MCCAR-
THY, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:26 (2d ed. 2006) (reviewing the emer-
gence of the appropriation tort in protection of a commercial interest in one’s identity).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c.
153. See Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 68–69, 71 (Ga. 1905) (acknowl-
edging for the first time that a common law right of privacy had been violated by the
unauthorized commercial use of a person’s identity); Prosser, supra note 114, at 386 (stat- R
ing that Pavesich was the leading decision holding that tort law recognized infringement
upon the right to privacy).
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the right of publicity,154 which more specifically protects a property
interest in identity, awarding damages based on the commercial value
of that identity.155  The two causes of action address the same behav-
ior by the defendant (the unauthorized use of identity to benefit the
defendant), but award damages based on different theories.156  Right
of publicity plaintiffs tend to be celebrities, while appropriation plain-
tiffs tend to be those whose identities have less readily quantifiable
commercial value.157
The typical appropriation case involves a non-famous plaintiff
whose name or photograph is used without permission in an advertise-
ment.158  The issues in these cases often focus on whether the defen-
154. Professor McCarthy, for example, defines the right of publicity as the “inherent
right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity,” which is
sufficiently broad to subsume the appropriation tort. MCCARTHY, supra note 151, § 1:3; see R
also Harold R. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 NW. U.
L. REV. 553, 555 (1960) (defining right of publicity as “the right to be free from commer-
cial exploitation” (emphasis omitted)).  Professor McCarthy views the right as a hybrid of
privacy (addressing the mental distress of seeing one’s name or image used without per-
mission), unfair competition (prohibiting the use without permission of the commercial
value of a person’s identity for the purposes of trade), and intellectual property (protect-
ing a property right in the commercial value of one’s identity). MCCARTHY, supra note 151, R
§§ 1:6, 1:7; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995) (describing the use
of a person’s identity “for purposes of trade”); see also LIBEL DEF. RES. CTR., INC., LDRC 50-
STATE SURVEY: MEDIA PRIVACY AND RELATED LAW, 2002–2003, at 1520 (combining misappro-
priation and right of publicity in same row of issue table).  It is generally accepted, how-
ever, that the right of publicity grew out of the tort of appropriation. See Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Is Independence Day Dawning for the Right of Publicity?, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
191, 193 (1983) (stating that the right of publicity sprang from privacy doctrine and noting
the historical connection between the right of publicity and the appropriation tort); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995) (stating that the right of
publicity has its historical roots in application of the appropriation tort in commercial
circumstances).
155. See, e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that the
right of publicity tort gives a celebrity the right to defend an “economic interest in his or
her name”); Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 325 (6th
Cir. 2001) (stating that the right of publicity protects a commercial interest and is a prop-
erty right); Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating
that the right of publicity preserves the right of a person to use his identity commercially).
156. See MCCARTHY, supra note 151, § 1:7 (distinguishing pecuniary and psychological R
damages).  Depending on the circumstances, the misuse of personal information might fit
either or both theories: the injury to dignity caused by the unauthorized use of personal
information or by the existence of a digital doppelganger compiled without permission
(appropriation); the injury to pocketbook caused by identity theft (publicity).
157. See id. (noting that the right of publicity developed to address famous plaintiffs’
claims).
158. See, e.g., Fanelle v. LoJack Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560, 564 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (hold-
ing that unauthorized use of photograph of individual charged with car theft in an anti-
theft advertisement stated a claim of appropriation); Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50
S.E. 68, 79 (Ga. 1905) (holding that unauthorized use of photograph of plaintiff in adver-
tisement for life insurance was an invasion of privacy); Harbin v. Jennings, 734 So. 2d 269,
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dant’s use was commercial—although the Restatement specifically notes
that the use need not be commercial, and cases have been successfully
pursued in noncommercial contexts.159  In an effort to protect the
freedom of the press, the bar for determining whether the defen-
dant’s use was commercial has been set high.  The use must be an
explicit “solicitation for patronage.”160  If the use involves matters of
even remotely public interest and the plaintiff’s identity is reasonably
related to the matter, the use is considered newsworthy, protected by
the First Amendment, and not commercial.161  In practice, the news-
worthiness standard is a significant obstacle for plaintiffs bringing ap-
propriation claims.162
The classic publicity case involves the use of a celebrity’s identity
without permission as an endorsement for a product.  The issues in
such cases often revolve around identification—whether the plaintiff
is sufficiently identifiable from the defendant’s use.  In most jurisdic-
tions, the right of publicity is not strictly limited to the defendant’s use
of the plaintiff’s “name or likeness.”163  Most common law states inter-
pret the traditional phrases “name or likeness” to include any aspect
of the plaintiff’s persona, including vocal style, body movement, cos-
tume, makeup, setting, nickname, or a combination of any of these.
Thus, for example, a robotic simulacrum of Vanna White was suffi-
272 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that unauthorized use of a photograph in picture frames
displayed to the public was a “textbook example” of appropriation); Faber v. Condecor,
Inc., 477 A.2d 1289, 1294–95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (affirming jury award for
defendant’s unauthorized use of plaintiffs’ photograph in picture frame display); Flake v.
Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 64 (N.C. 1938) (holding that the use of photograph in
an advertisement without the subject’s permission is an actionable invasion of privacy).
159. See, e.g., Steding v. Battistoni, 208 A.2d 559, 562 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964) (stating that
using the name of another to pursue legal action was appropriation); Hinish v. Meier &
Frank Co., 113 P.2d 438, 439, 448 (Or. 1941) (holding that plaintiff stated an appropria-
tion claim against defendant who signed plaintiff’s name on a telegram to the governor).
160. Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382, 386 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
161. See, e.g., Arrington v. N.Y. Times Co., 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1320, 1322–23 (N.Y. 1982)
(finding no appropriation when newspaper published plaintiff’s photograph next to an
article about the “black middle class” because the photograph was related to an article of
public interest); Lahiri, 295 N.Y.S. at 389–90 (finding no appropriation when newspaper
published plaintiff’s photograph in article about a “famous rope trick” because it related to
a matter of legitimate news interest (internal quotation marks omitted)).
162. See Claire E. Gorman, Comment, Publicity and Privacy Rights: Evening Out the Playing
Field for Celebrities and Private Citizens in the Modern Game of Mass Media, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
1247, 1263–68 (2004) (describing the First Amendment obstacles that plaintiffs face when
asserting right of privacy claims).
163. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. 971 F.2d 1395, 1397–99 (9th Cir. 1992) (re-
jecting lower court’s limitation of appropriation tort to plaintiff’s “name or likeness”).
However, some states with publicity statutes narrowly limit these terms. E.g., N.Y. CIV. RTS.
§ 51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2006) (limiting recovery to appropriation of plaintiff’s
“name, portrait, picture or voice”).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR103.txt unknown Seq: 30  5-DEC-06 13:06
2006] REINING IN THE DATA TRADERS 169
ciently identifiable as White—through dress, mannerisms, hairstyle,
and context—to be actionable.164
Of all the branches of privacy torts, commentators have identified
the appropriation/right of publicity torts in their broadest forms as
the most promising for addressing the misuse of personal informa-
tion, for two reasons.  First, understood broadly, the rights protected
by these torts are infringed whenever a defendant, without permis-
sion, makes a commercial use of the plaintiff’s identity that either
causes the plaintiff mental distress or damages the value of the plain-
tiff’s identity.165  Thus, the torts theoretically redress nonconsensual
uses of personal information—such as the combining, profiling, and
mining of information that causes mental distress, or the sale of infor-
mation that causes the fear of identity theft or actual identity theft.
Second, the breadth with which courts have treated identity also
seems promising.  Data traders deal quite specifically in information
that identifies a person, and the value of the information is based on
the accuracy and completeness with which the person is identified.
The broad definition of personality means that these torts could ex-
tend to identifying information—such as addresses, telephone num-
bers, birthdates, Social Security numbers, travel and transactional
data—because a combination of these items (or indeed some of them
individually) would suffice to accurately identify the plaintiff.
In practice, however, data traders have never successfully been
sued using these privacy torts.  One limitation on their use is that the
torts presume that the defendant is using the plaintiff’s identity for his
own advantage.  Thus, the torts miss situations in which data traders
misuse personal information through negligent handling or the acci-
dental release of personal information, which are typically errors, not
practices that advantage the defendant.  Even the failure to rectify in-
correct information is arguably not to the data trader’s advantage.
More importantly, data trading does not easily mesh with the
tort’s paradigm, which involves the use of the plaintiff’s name or like-
ness in an advertisement.  Courts may struggle with the analogy to
data brokers, who trade in lists or databases of personal information.
Two cases all but killed the prospects of using this tort to address the
164. White, 971 F.2d at 1396, 1399; see also Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d
407, 414–15 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding “name and likeness” not limited to present use and
allowing an athlete to pursue an action for the appropriation of his former name); Waits v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098, 1100, 1112 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding a verdict
against a snack manufacturer for appropriating the voice of well-known singer Tom Waits
in a radio commercial).
165. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 151, at v (commenting that the legal right of public- R
ity protects an individual’s “inherent” ownership of his identity).
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misuse of personal information.  In the much-maligned Shibley v. Time,
Inc.,166 an Ohio court held that the sale by Time Magazine of subscrip-
tion lists to direct marketers was not an actionable appropriation of
the plaintiffs’ names.  The reasoning in Shibley was based on two au-
thorities: an Ohio statute authorizing the sale of car registration
records,167 and a federal case168 upholding a New York statute that
authorized the state to sell its lists of registered car owners to direct
marketers.169  The court apparently reasoned that the legal sale of
such records indicated that individuals did not have a protected pri-
vacy interest in their identifying information.170  The Dwyer court, rely-
ing on Shibley, also dismissed an appropriation claim, finding that the
plaintiffs had failed to show an appropriation because “a single, ran-
dom cardholder’s name has little or no intrinsic value.”171  Rather, the
value attached to the name derived from the aggregation and analysis
of the data conducted by American Express.172
Two more recent cases show that the appropriation tort may yet
accommodate information privacy claims.  In 2003, the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire dismissed an appropriation claim against a
private investigator who sold information about a woman to her
stalker who later killed her.173  The court reasoned that the investiga-
tor sold the information “for the value of the information itself, not to
take advantage of the person’s reputation or prestige.”174  This line of
reasoning suggests that the observe theory might succeed: a data
trader who compiles and sells lists of information not for the value of
the information itself, but precisely because it hopes to trade on the indi-
viduals’ “social or commercial standing”175—their spending habits,
166. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
167. Id. at 339.
168. Lamont v. Comm’r of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
169. Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339–40.  The Ohio and New York statutes have since been
superseded by the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (DPPA), which prevents states
from disclosing a driver’s personal information without his consent.  18 U.S.C.
§§ 2721–2725 (2000); see also Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 350g, 113 Stat. 1025 (1999) (including
New York and Ohio as states where the DPPA applies).  The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the DPPA in Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
170. See Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339–40.  This line of reasoning invalidates the very interest
protected by the appropriation tort—the right to control the use of one’s identity.
171. Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
172. Id.  Others have noted the difficulty of quantifying the value of one name or one
set of personal data.  Generally, data is traded in batches, and so is more valuable in the
aggregate than in individual units.  McClurg, supra note 8, at 118.  For an analysis of the R
failures of the personal information market, see Schwartz, supra note 20, at 2076–84. R
173. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1010 (N.H. 2003).
174. Id.
175. Id.
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preferences, interests, or creditworthiness—would be liable for appro-
priation, at least in the state of New Hampshire.
The Weld court also took an expansive view of the appropriation
tort, noting that the tort is not strictly limited to commercial or adver-
tising uses, but that it also applies when the defendant uses the plain-
tiff’s name “‘for his own purposes and benefit . . . even though the
benefit . . . is not a pecuniary one.’”176  Based on the factual scenario
in that case—CVS used the plaintiffs’ private information for financial
gain—the plaintiffs had alleged a violation of the appropriation tort.
It is unlikely, however, that Weld will generate positive precedent, as
the common law tort of appropriation is probably preempted by stat-
ute in Massachusetts.177
Despite some promising dicta, the fact remains that plaintiffs us-
ing privacy tort theories have never yet held data traders accountable
for misusing the personal information of data subjects.  The torts are
possibly useful if it can be shown, as in Weld, that using a name as part
of a process invades a person’s privacy, or, as noted in Remsburg, that
the data trader has sold the plaintiff’s identifying information to profit
from her social standing or prestige.  In general, however, the torts as
formulated by Prosser are not a comfortable fit with the trading of
personal information.  The major obstacles are that first, the defini-
tion of “private” is too narrow to cover much of the personal informa-
tion in data files; second, the publicity requirement is not clearly met
by commercial transactions; third, the highly offensive requirement
may be difficult to meet in today’s tell-all world; and fourth, the sale of
personal information does not easily mesh with the paradigm for the
appropriation tort.  Tort law in its current form has failed to evolve
adequately and sufficiently to address information abuse; the misuses
have outpaced the current system.  It thus remains an unlikely option
for individuals searching for information privacy remedies, unless a
new tort that better fits the harms of information misuse evolves.
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
A comparative history of products liability provides a useful anal-
ogy, as well as the basis of this Article’s argument, that tort law is a
time-honored vehicle for facilitating solutions to emerging harms.
The European model is creationist: a central authority enacts univer-
176. Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. Civ. A. 98-0897F, 1999 WL 494114, at *6 (Mass.
Super. Ct. June 29, 1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b
(1977)).
177. Id.
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sal model legislation, such as the Liability for Defective Products Di-
rective,178 that results in the gradual harmonization of products
liability laws in the member states of the European Community.179  By
contrast, the American model, which relies on individual plaintiffs
and injuries, is Darwinian.  After the British courts failed to act in
products liability cases, state courts in this country experimented with
various evolving theories of liability, including exceptions to the rule
of privity, and extensions to the categories of who could sue whom,
for what types of injuries, and from what types of products.180  Eventu-
ally, the common law coalesced around the principle of strict liabil-
ity,181 which has since been adopted, modified, or left alone by state
legislatures.
Remarkably, we are following neither the creationist nor the Dar-
winian model in addressing the injuries caused by the misuse of per-
sonal information.182  However, because it is now clear that industry
lobbying has succeeded while self-regulation has failed, and that legis-
latures have either failed to act or provided solutions that inade-
quately address the injuries, individuals must—indeed, should—look
to the judiciary to help resolve the misuse of personal information.183
178. Council Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (EC).
179. See Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, Desperately Seeking Harmony: The European
Community’s Search for Uniformity in Product Liability Law, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 35 (1992); Sandra
N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for
United States Business, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 245 (1993).
180. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 9–24 (1980) (discussing
the American judiciary’s departure from British common law rule of privity).
181. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103–10 (1960) (discussing the unmooring of privity of contract
from torts involving food and drink law and the imposition of strict liability for claims);
William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV.
791, 794–97 (1966) (documenting the spread of strict liability to other areas of law).
182. “The United States may be unique in endorsing self-regulation without legal sanc-
tions to incentivize or enforce it; it is hard to believe that the strategy is anything more than
a political device to avoid regulation.”  Froomkin, supra note 25, at 1527 (footnote R
omitted).
183. Public choice theory predicts the failure of Congress to pass legislation protecting
consumers against information abuse: as a narrow and well-funded interest group, data
traders have attempted to block legislation that would benefit a widely dispersed and not
well-organized group. Cf. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW & PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 33 (1991) (depicting the role of special interest groups in influ-
encing legislative behavior).  Judicial creativity is arguably a valid response in such circum-
stances, particularly when interest groups have distorted the legislative process and tort
wrongs are left unremedied. See Fenrich, supra note 5, at 994–95 (advocating that courts R
should take an active role in extending tort law to cover cases of information abuse); Ed-
mund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 229, 245–50 (1981)
(arguing that the judiciary is better positioned to create tort reform than legislators who
are beholden to special interest groups); see also Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the
Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
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It is again time to propose a tort for the misuse of personal infor-
mation.184  The new tort will borrow from existing areas of law—the
four privacy torts and existing privacy statutes—but will be tailored to
address the specifics of information abuse.  Seen in the context of ex-
isting privacy torts and statutes, the tort is not a radical departure
from the existing scheme, but more of a gap-filler or a cautious expan-
sion, as it addresses injuries that implicate core privacy interests but
currently have no remedy.  Like the appropriation tort, the new tort
remedies the harm to an individual caused by his loss of control over
his identity when a data trader uses it without his permission.  Like the
Privacy Act, the new tort uses the principles of Fair Information Prac-
tices—notice, choice, access, and security185—as the minimum stan-
dard for acceptable data management.  The tort charts new ground in
expanding the definition of what is considered private, in targeting
commercial uses of data, and in transferring the principles of Fair In-
formation Practices from the public sector to the private sector.  This
is what the tort would look like:
• One who collects, stores, analyzes, or trades in personal infor-
mation is liable to the subject of that information for the fail-
ure to use Fair Information Practices.
• The tort would apply to any private entity that collects, stores,
analyzes, or trades in personal information.
• Personal information would include any information that is
linked with an individual.
• The tort would impose on data traders a duty to use Fair Infor-
mation Practices (based on the principles of notice, choice,
access, and security).
• The tort would protect the individual’s privacy interests in
choice and control—choice about who may receive his per-
875, 905–06 (1991) (concluding that the common law remains a viable method of promot-
ing legal changes that respond to societal needs).
184. For other articles proposing a new tort, see Natalie L. Regoli, A Tort for Prying E-
Eyes, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 267, 269 (suggesting that a new tort should be created
that targets the “[s]urreptitious collection, storage, use and sale of personal data”);
Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Personal
Information, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1419 (1987) (proposing a new tort of “commercial dis-
semination of private information” to protect information privacy).
185. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (2000 & Supp. 2006) (notice); id. § 552a(b) (choice);
id. § 552a(d) (access); id. § 552a(e) (security).  Professor Vincent Johnson argues that
database owners have or should have a legal obligation to data subjects to safeguard per-
sonal data and to notify them when the security of their data has been breached.  Vincent
R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255,
263–64, 288 (2005).  He bases the standard of care on federal and state data security stat-
utes, tort principles, and the law of fiduciary duty. Id. at 264.
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sonal information and control over the information revealed
and how the recipient may use it.  Accordingly, damages
would be awarded based on injuries to the individual’s choice
and control.
The following sections examine these elements in turn.
A. Potential Defendants: “One who Collects, Stores, Analyzes, or Trades”
Potential defendants would include any entity that collects,
stores, analyzes, or trades in personal information, and thus would
specifically include data traders such as merchants, direct marketers,
retail establishments, and travel agents.  In other words, potential de-
fendants would include every actor who maintains databases of per-
sonal information, except when the privacy policies of those actors are
regulated by specific legislation that preempts common law.  The data
traders most susceptible to this tort would be merchants, service prov-
iders, and direct marketers, who currently are exempt from most legis-
lation governing data privacy.
To the extent that a data trader functions as a consumer report-
ing agency (CRA), it will fall within the limitations of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA),186 which would probably preempt any tort
claims.187  The FCRA defines CRAs as entities that assemble and sell
credit or other information about individuals.188  In the past, however,
retail establishments have generally not been considered CRAs,189 and
it is not clear whether service providers (such as travel agents) or data
brokers who collect and sell broad categories of data are considered
CRAs.  Thus, many of the data traders subject to tort liability for the
misuse of information are not CRAs.
186. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2000 & Supp. 2006).
187. Id. § 1681t(a).  Federal privacy laws are generally considered to be “floors” and
have not preempted stronger state laws.  In fact, many federal statutes explicitly allow states
to enact stronger privacy protections. See, e.g., Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988,
29 U.S.C. §§ 2001–2009 (2000); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C.
§ 227 (2000). But see Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the affiliate-sharing clause in FCRA partially preempts the stricter affiliate-
sharing provision in California’s Financial Information Privacy Act).
188. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f).
189. See, e.g., Miller v. Trans Union Corp., 24 F. App’x 422, 424  (6th Cir. 2001) (con-
cluding that neither a bank nor a tire company were CRAs under the FCRA because there
was no evidence that either assembled or collected consumer data to distribute to third
parties); Rush v. Macy’s N.Y., Inc., 775 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that de-
partment store was not a CRA because it only provided consumer information to a report-
ing agency and did not use it for profit).
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CRAs generally may not use consumer credit reports for target
marketing,190 as FCRA restricts the distribution of consumer reports
to applications for credit, insurance, and transactions initiated by the
consumer.191  However, FCRA allows CRAs to share the information
in consumer reports with their corporate affiliates,192 and permits
CRAs to sell identifying information—name, mother’s maiden name,
date of birth, sex, address, previous address, Social Security number,
and telephone number—when that information is not connected with
a person’s creditworthiness.193  To the extent that a CRA is trading in
data not specifically designated a consumer report by FCRA, the CRA
might be subject to a tort claim, depending on a preemption analy-
sis.194  Further, the tort would apply to any affiliates who received per-
sonal information from a CRA, provided they are not themselves
CRAs.
B. Information Protected: “Personal Information”
This tort would remedy the misuse of any personal information,
broadly defined as any information that is linked with an individual.
This definition includes full names, addresses, birthdates, Social Se-
curity numbers, biometrics, transactional data, travel data, work ad-
dresses, consumer preference or lifestyle profiles, telephone
numbers—in short, any information collected, stored, analyzed, or
produced by data traders, when it is or may be used to identify or
contact an individual195 (except where preempted by specific legisla-
tion, such as the regulation by FCRA of consumer reports).
Despite this broad definition of personal information, it is proba-
bly less likely that the tort will encounter First Amendment limitations
similar to those that cabin the public disclosure and false light torts,
190. Trans Union Corp. v. FTC (Trans Union I), 81 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(c).  Credit reports may also be procured by court order, for
employment purposes, and to state child support enforcement agencies. Id. § 1681b(a).
192. Id. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(iii).
193. Id. § 1681b.  A consumer report is defined as “bearing on a consumer’s credit wor-
thiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal character-
istics, or mode of living,” which is used to establish the consumer’s eligibility for credit,
insurance, or employment. Id. § 1681a(d)(1).  However, “[a] report limited solely to the
consumer’s name and address alone, with no connotations as to credit worthiness or other
characteristics, does not constitute a ‘consumer report.’”  Commentary on the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 16 C.F.R. pt. 600, app. at 496 (2006).
194. The Ninth Circuit held that FCRA preempted state privacy law only insofar as it
regulated the kind of information included in consumer reports—that is, information spe-
cifically regulated by FCRA.  Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Gould, 412 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir.
2005).
195. See supra note 2. R
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precisely because this tort does not have a publicity requirement,196
and it is almost beyond dispute that personal information of the sort
traded by data brokers is not a matter of legitimate public interest
(except in rare situations involving a public figure).197
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet established
how it will analyze limits and regulations placed on personal informa-
tion that is used and traded in a commercial context.  There are indi-
cations that such data is entitled to reduced First Amendment
protection, either because it is speech that does not involve a matter
of legitimate public interest, or because it is commercial speech.
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,198 a plurality of
the court applied intermediate scrutiny to a defamation action con-
cerning false data contained in a credit report.199  In Trans Union
Corp. v. FTC (Trans Union II),200 the D.C. Circuit followed the reason-
ing of the Dun & Bradstreet plurality, applying intermediate scrutiny to
196. Eugene Volokh argues that government enforcement of Fair Information Practice
codes would have troubling normative implications for the First Amendment: “Once peo-
ple grow to accept and even like government restrictions on one kind of supposedly ‘un-
fair’ communication of facts, it may become much easier for people to accept ‘codes of fair
reporting,’ ‘codes of fair debate,’ ‘codes of fair filmmaking,’ ‘codes of fair political criti-
cism,’ and the like.”  Volokh, supra note 24, at 1116 (footnote omitted).  His critique ig- R
nores the fundamental difference between speech such as reporting, debate, filmmaking,
and political critique, which is conveyed to a general public, and speech conveyed between
individuals that primarily serves an economic purpose.  Further, his critique does not con-
sider whether personal information, when sold as a commodity, is even speech.  Neil Rich-
ards argues that many information privacy rules—such as one requiring data traders to
secure their databases—have nothing to do with regulating speech but rather, can be
viewed as regulating conduct, and further, that the regulation of “information flows” pur-
suant to a commercial relationship “is neither ‘speech’ within the current meaning of the
First Amendment, nor should it be viewed as such.”  Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data
Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1169 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
197. Cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 (1985)
(plurality opinion) (“[T]here is simply no credible argument that [false] credit reporting
requires special protection to ensure that ‘debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.’”).  Volokh argues that personal information is of great interest to
people in “deciding how to behave in their daily lives, whether daily business or daily per-
sonal lives—whom to approach to do business, whom to trust with their money, and the
like.”  Volokh, supra note 24, at 1115.  The tort would not shut down this kind of informa- R
tion exchange; people interested in entering into business relationships with one another
can voluntarily exchange information, or request that their data files be released to a third-
party.
198. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (plurality opinion).
199. Id. at 762.  The plurality found that a wholly false credit report “was speech solely in
the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience,” which consisted of
five corporate customers. Id.  Accordingly, the credit reports were speech that “con-
cern[ed] no public issue,” and the award of presumed and punitive damages in the defa-
mation action against Dun & Bradstreet, in the absence of actual malice, did not violate
the First Amendment. Id. at 762–63.
200. 245 F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR103.txt unknown Seq: 38  5-DEC-06 13:06
2006] REINING IN THE DATA TRADERS 177
regulation under FCRA of the sale of certain truthful “target market-
ing products” sold by Trans Union.201  The products at issue were lists
of names and addresses of individuals who met criteria—such as pos-
session of a credit card with a $10,000 limit, car loan, or mortgage of a
certain amount—specified by the purchaser of the list.202  Trans
Union compiled the lists from its credit databases, releasing the iden-
tifying information to the purchaser but withholding the credit de-
tails.203  Purchasers of the data would know, however, that every
person on the target list had met the creditor’s criteria.204  Examining
the content, form, and context of the target lists, the court found that
Trans Union’s lists constituted speech unrelated to any public con-
cern, which “is solely of interest to [Trans Union] and its business
customers.”205  In Trans Union Corp. v. FTC (Trans Union III),206 the
court noted that the privacy concerns in Trans Union’s case were sig-
nificant because the lists contained names and addresses of individu-
als—not publicly traded corporations whose articles of incorporation
and financial statements are generally open to public inspection.207
Accordingly, the restriction under FCRA of the sale of the target mar-
keting products directly served the substantial government interest of
protecting the privacy of consumer credit information, and was no
more extensive than needed to serve that interest.208
The implications of the Trans Union decisions are that regulations
on the sale of truthful data that exceeds basic identifying information
(i.e., transactional or travel data, or personality profiles) will be sub-
jected to intermediate First Amendment scrutiny, provided that the
data’s content, form, and context reveal no matters of public concern,
and that the protection of individual consumer privacy will likely qual-
ify as a substantial government interest.  The Dun & Bradstreet plurality
opinion also suggests that presumed and punitive damages are not a
more extensive regulation than needed by the state to protect that
interest.209
201. Id. at 818.
202. Id. at 815.
203. Id. at 812.
204. Id.  Because these lists qualified as consumer credit reports, the FTC prohibited
Trans Union from selling them. Id. at 812–13.
205. Id. at 818.
206. 267 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
207. Id. at 1140.
208. See id. at 1142–44; Trans Union II, 245 F.3d at 819. But see Equifax Servs., Inc. v.
Cohen, 420 A.2d 189, 200 (Me. 1980) (invalidating parts of the Maine Fair Credit Report-
ing Act for failing to advance a substantial government interest and for regulating speech
more extensively than is necessary).
209. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763.
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The Dun & Bradstreet plurality specifically declined to find that
credit reports were commercial speech, although it discussed com-
mercial speech cases to show that the arguments in favor of reduced
protection for commercial speech similarly apply to credit reports.210
Thus it is still possible that lists of personal information sold or rented
for marketing purposes could be treated as commercial speech and
subject to the test outlined by the Supreme Court in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.211  According to the
Central Hudson Court, to receive First Amendment protection, the
speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading; in addi-
tion, the government must have a substantial interest in regulating the
speech, and the regulation cannot be more extensive than necessary
to serve that interest.212  It is difficult to predict how an indirect regu-
lation (like a tort) on the commercial use of personal information
would fare under the first part of this test, because the speech in ques-
tion (the information) does not concern an activity so much as an
identity, and it does not propose a commercial transaction so much as
convey a commodity (the identity itself) that will eventually be used in
the process of proposing a commercial transaction.213  If it were con-
sidered protected commercial speech, however, it is likely that the tort
would survive Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny given the substan-
tial government interest in protection of information privacy and that
a tort claim for damages is not a more extensive regulation than nec-
essary to protect the interests of the individual who has been harmed.
Finally, it is also possible that the personal information used by
data traders is not even “speech” protected by the First Amend-
ment.214  The Central Hudson Court emphasized that the concern for
commercial speech in the First Amendment is based on the power of
210. Id. at 762 & n.8.  Commercial speech cases have, for the most part, concerned
advertisements, although commercial speech is defined more broadly as “expression re-
lated solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”  Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).  The Tenth Circuit has twice
found that restrictions on the commercial use of personal data implicated the First Amend-
ment. See Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that the national “do-not-call registry [wa]s a valid commercial speech regulation,” noting,
in part, that the list restricted “only core commercial speech—i.e., commercial sales calls”);
U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that regulations
requiring telephone services providers to get the affirmative consent of their customers
before using CPNI for direct marketing were invalid commercial speech regulations).
211. 447 U.S. at 566.
212. Id.
213. But see U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1232–33 (reasoning that telephone carriers wanted to
use CPNI for commercial solicitation, so any restriction on the use of CPNI is a restriction
on commercial speech).
214. Richards, supra note 196, at 1152. R
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speech to inform the public, even as it simultaneously serves the
speaker’s economic interests.215  This focus on informing the public
suggests that commercial speech that is not publicly disseminated, but
rather distributed solely as an incident of a commercial transaction,
might not receive any First Amendment protection.216  A possible ex-
ample of such treatment occurred in Reno v. Condon,217 in which the
Supreme Court found that the personal information covered by the
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act—photograph, Social Security number,
driver identification number, name, address, and telephone num-
ber—was, in the context of its sale and resale, “an article of com-
merce.”218  Because the information was a commodity, Congress could
subject its use in commerce to reasonable regulations.  The issue in
Reno was federalism—whether Congress had the power to regulate in-
formation as commerce—and the parties did not raise First Amend-
ment questions.  If the Court were to conclude that personal
information as used by data traders is a commodity, not speech, a tort
that indirectly regulates the use of that commodity would be tested
under the principles of substantive economic due process and equal
215. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561–62.  The Court noted that:
Commercial expression not only serves the economic interest of the speaker, but
also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible dis-
semination of information.  In applying the First Amendment to this area, we
have rejected the “highly paternalistic” view that government has complete power
to suppress or regulate commercial speech.  “[P]eople will perceive their own
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and . . . the best means to
that end is to open the channels of communication, rather than to close
them. . . .”  Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete version of
the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information
is better than no information at all.
Id. (citations omitted).
216. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).  The Court opined that:
[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or
printed.  Numerous examples could be cited of communications that are regu-
lated without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of informa-
tion about securities, corporate proxy statements, [and] the exchange of price
and production information among competitors . . . .
Id. at 456 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also L.A. Police Dep’t v.
United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999) (upholding state law that restricted
media access to identifying information about arrestees).
217. 528 U.S. 141 (1999).
218. Id. at 148.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR103.txt unknown Seq: 41  5-DEC-06 13:06
180 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:140
protection law.  It is almost certain that the tort would survive rational
basis review.219
C. Standard of Care: “The Failure to Use Fair Information Practices”220
The tort would impose a minimum standard of care on private
entities to abide by the same standards of Fair Information Princi-
ples—notice, choice, access, and security221—that bind the federal
government.  The principles of Fair Information Practice were devel-
oped in the 1970s by a government task force grappling with the man-
agement of enormous government databases.222  These four
principles were implemented in the Privacy Act of 1974,223 which gov-
erns the collection, storage, processing, and disclosure of personal in-
formation by federal agencies.  These practices, while somewhat bare
bones,224 have the advantage of being globally accepted and long es-
tablished225 and, thus, would provide few surprises to data traders (in-
deed, the DMA has already pledged its commitment to using such
practices).226
219. See Richards, supra note 196, at 1171–73 (positing that fair information regulations R
should be subject to the low level scrutiny employed by courts in other contexts—i.e., ra-
tional basis review).
220. Although this tort has been presented using the language of negligence, the
argument could be made for creating a strict liability tort, particularly because of the cost
and difficulty of administering a negligence regime. See Epstein, supra note 180, at 28–30. R
221. See Gellman, supra note 25, at 195–202 (discussing the statutory codes under the R
Privacy Act of 1974 that set forth the rules governing “the collection, maintenance, use,
and disclosure of personal information held by federal agencies”).
222. See generally ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973),
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/hew1973report.
223. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000 & Supp. 2006); see also PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMIS-
SION, supra note 77, at 500–03 (outlining the elements of the Privacy Act and evaluating the R
implementation of revisions).
224. Since the 1970s, various government agencies have issued refined lists of Fair Infor-
mation Practices.  In the online context, the FTC described them as (1) Notice/Awareness;
(2) Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation; (4) Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforce-
ment/Redress. FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7–11 (1998), available at
http://ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf.  More recently, the Department of Com-
merce described its own set of principles in the context of companies that want to qualify
as “safe harbors” that can receive data from companies bound by the European Data Direc-
tive. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES (2000) [hereinafter SAFE
HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/SH-
PRINCIPLESFINAL.htm.  The principles include notice, choice, access, security, data in-
tegrity, enforcement, and “onward transfer,” which requires the safe harbor company to
determine that any third party to which it transfers data follows these principles. Id.
225. Cf. Gellman, supra note 25, at 213–15 (noting the influence of U.S. privacy policies R
on international privacy standards).
226. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. R
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In addition, using the principles of Fair Information Practices as
a standard of care emphasizes that the tort targets a data trader’s mis-
use of data, rather than the mere collection or possession of data (un-
less the data were obtained surreptitiously, as by pretexting).227
Instead, the tort targets data abuses occurring at the analysis and use
stages of the data flow, including the unauthorized sale, renting, or
mining of personal information, and its negligent release.228  The
charts in the Appendix that follow this Article correlate the principles
of Fair Information Practices with liability for misuse.
1. The Choice Principle
The choice principle would compel data traders to seek the con-
sent of their data subjects before using personal information obtained
for one purpose in a way that is incompatible229 with that purpose.230
The choice principle provides that there must be a way for an individ-
227. See Zarsky, supra note 28, at 32–33 (asserting that reform efforts should not be R
concentrated on the collections stage of data trading).  Professor Zarsky argues that
“[s]ince any form of regulation within this context will be met with strong and powerful
opposition, legislation must be pragmatic and focus its concern on the actual detriments
that may occur.  Solutions should protect the public from dangerous uses of personal in-
formation, rather than mere surveillance.” Id.
228. See id. at 17–32 (dividing the data flow into three discrete stages: collection, analy-
sis, and use or implementation).
229. The compatibility standard is part of the Privacy Act, which requires a government
agency to tell individuals the principle purpose or use of the information it collects, to
explain the “routine use” that may be made of the information, and to publish a notice in
the Federal Register that specifically describes the routine uses of records it maintains.  5
U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)–(4).  A routine use must be “compatible with the purpose for which
[the information] [i]s collected.” Id. § 552a(a)(7).  This means that there must be a “con-
crete relationship or similarity, some meaningful degree of convergence, between the dis-
closing agency’s purpose in gathering the information and in its disclosure.”  Britt v. Naval
Investigative Serv., 886 F.2d 544, 549–50 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Covert v. Harrington, 876
F.2d 751, 755–56 (9th Cir. 1989) (determining that the Department of Energy’s disclosure
of nuclear employees’ personnel security questionnaires to Department of Justice, for the
purpose of criminal prosecution, violated the Privacy Act because the Department did not
notify the employees that the questionnaire could be used for law enforcement purposes;
rather, employees were expressly told that the information would be used only for security
clearance purposes); Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 713 n.31 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (sug-
gesting that the communication to a prospective employer of derogatory information con-
cerning a former federal employee’s dismissal is not compatible with the purpose for
which the information was collected); S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 69 (1974) (recognizing that
the Privacy Act “prevents an agency from merely citing a notice of intended ‘use’ as a
routine and easy means of justifying transfer or release of information”).  The routine use
standard has been described as a “gaping loophole” in the Privacy Act.  Kang, supra note
22, at 1271; see also Nehf, supra note 25, at 41–42 (calling the routine use standard a “glar- R
ing failure”).
230. Based on a detailed economic analysis, Professor Kang concludes that, as a “default
rule,” the “information collector should process data only in functionally necessary ways,”
unless the parties agree otherwise.  Kang, supra note 22, at 1259. R
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ual to prevent information about him obtained for one purpose from
being used or made available for other purposes without his
consent.231
The choice principle would allow individuals to limit meaning-
fully the secondary uses of their data, including sale, rental, aggrega-
tion, profiling, and mining, because without the explicit consent of
the data subject, the data trader would become liable for these prac-
tices.  Thus, a retailer who collects information for one use (the
purchase and shipping of a classical music CD) and sells or rents it for
another (direct marketing of similar CDs) would violate the standard
of care.232  Construed broadly, this principle would prevent data shar-
ing between affiliates (unless preempted by a statute such as FCRA or
GLBA), and might even require the retailer to obtain consent before
using purchasing information for future direct marketing of his own
products.
The practical effect of the choice principle is to force data traders
to discover—and honor—the privacy preferences of their data sub-
jects.  A self-imposed, low-cost, and effective way to do so would be to
establish a clearinghouse Website or hotline (similar to the national
Do-Not-Call list or OptOutPrescreen.com) that would allow individu-
als to indicate their data privacy preferences.  Presumably, these pref-
erences could range from strong privacy preferring (an almost total
restriction on data use except for functionally necessary233 purposes)
to weaker privacy preferring (permitting aggregation, profiling, or
permitting data sharing with third parties).  Data traders would be
motivated to participate in such a system because it facilitates discover-
ing the privacy preferences of their data subjects, has national applica-
tion, and would not entail comprehensive government regulation.
231. See SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, supra note 224 (setting forth the choice R
principle).
232. Currently, this type of incompatible use is subject to FTC regulation, but only if the
data trader violates its own privacy policy.  Zarsky, supra note 28, at 26. R
233. Kang defines functionally necessary uses, particularly as related to commercial
transactions in cyberspace, in the following way:
[S]uccessful communication between parties; successful payment and delivery be-
tween parties, including accounting and debt collection through independent
contractors; successful dispute resolution between parties . . . ; warnings to the
individual of any defect or danger; maintenance of the information collector’s
cyberspace infrastructure; protection of the collector from fraud and abuse; and
adherence to governmental recordkeeping regulations . . . .
Kang, supra note 22, at 1271–72.  Functional necessity does not include future direct adver- R
tising from the information collector to the data subject, unless the subject specifically
agrees to this use. Id. at 1272.
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2. The Notice and Access Principles
The notice and access principles would require data traders to
notify individuals of the types of information they collect, the uses be-
ing made of their information, and to give individuals access to their
data profiles.234  The notice principle provides that there must be no
personal data record-keeping systems whose very existence is secret,235
which suggests that data subjects must be able to discover the types of
records that a company keeps, and particularly those that include an
individual’s information.  The access principle provides that there
must be a way for an individual to find out what information about
him is in a record and how it is used, and a way for an individual to
correct or amend a record of identifiable information about him.236
Notice and access to secondary uses of data are especially impor-
tant if individuals are to effectively police the accuracy of their data
profiles and investigate whether data traders are honoring their pri-
vacy choices.  Currently, it is difficult, if not impossible, for individuals
to gain access to their data files—even when they have been notified
that the security of the file has been compromised.237  Thus, for exam-
ple, individuals should not only have access to their personal informa-
tion, but they should also have access to a list that reveals whether
their data has been mined, sold, or rented, and if so, to whom.  They
should also have access to their personality profiles, and to the results
of any mining, provided such access does not reveal anyone else’s per-
sonal information.238  Data traders would not be liable for creating
profiles, provided that they do so with the individual’s consent, or for
234. I disagree that profiles are fully the “property” of the data traders who created
them, in the sense that they have the right to exclude all others from seeing the profiles,
especially the subjects of the profiles.  Zarsky, supra note 27, at 29 n.91.  Although the data R
trader has compiled the profile and probably owns a copyright in that profile, the individ-
ual who is the subject of the profile bears the risk of any of its inaccuracies and insults, and
Fair Information Practices require that she be notified of and able to access that profile.  A
sensible compromise between the competing interests of the individual and the data trader
would be to allow individuals to access only their own profiles, to prohibit copying of the
profiles except for personal use, and to permit data traders to conceal their methods or
processes of analysis (i.e., their algorithms, or anything protected as trade secrets).
235. See SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, supra note 224 (setting forth the notice R
principle).
236. See id. (setting forth the access principle).
237. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. R
238. I am less convinced than Zarsky about the benefits of preserving a company’s free
analysis of information, especially when companies like Axciom advertise that they analyze
data into ethnic and racial categories.  Zarsky, supra note 28, at 38; see also Reidenberg, R
supra note 1, at 883 (describing Axciom’s product catalog).  Plaintiffs who suspect that R
their personal information has been used to support some form of invidious discrimina-
tion particularly need to know how data traders have analyzed their information.
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the content of the profiles, provided they are otherwise legal; rather,
they would be liable for refusing to provide notice of and access to the
profiles.
3. The Security Principle
Finally, the security principle would hold data traders liable for
the negligent handling and protection of personal data.  The security
principle provides that any organization creating, maintaining, using,
or disseminating records of identifiable personal data must assure the
reliability of the data for its intended use and must take reasonable
precautions to prevent misuse of the data.239  Under this standard, a
plaintiff could recover if injured by a data trader’s negligent security
breach, as in the LexisNexis or Bank of America situations—or by the
negligent sale of information to third parties who have no legitimate
interest in seeing it, including criminals, as in the ChoicePoint situa-
tion—or exposure of data to foreseeable security risks during process-
ing, such as permitting certain inmates to process data in prison.240
Presumably, courts wrestling with information privacy torts would
refine these four principles, seeking guidance from privacy standards
in other federal or international laws.  The European Data Directive,
for example, additionally requires that data be stored for no longer
than necessary and prohibits the processing (analysis or mining) of
certain suspect categories of data, such as racial or ethnic origin, polit-
ical opinion, religious or philosophical belief, or health and sex
life.241  Incorporation of this principle would effectively limit the min-
ing or analysis of these suspect categories of information.
Finally, this standard of care could not be waived by agreement,
and thus would obligate data traders to deal fairly with the personal
information they already have in their databases, regardless of how
obtained or created—from public records or information provided by
the individual with or without the consent of the individual.  Because
the standard of care is a mandatory rule, it resolves the problem of
how to force data traders to deal fairly with the vast quantities of data
obtained from public records before more stringent privacy regula-
tions (such as the DPPA) were enacted, or from consumers who may
239. See SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, supra note 224 (setting forth the security R
principle).
240. See, e.g., Stanley S. Arkin, Misuse and Misappropriation of Electronically Stored Informa-
tion, N.Y. L.J., July 23, 2001, at 3 (discussing the Metromail settlement in which Metromail
was sued by a woman who was stalked by a former inmate who had processed her personal
data while in prison).
241. Council Directive 95/46, art. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40–41 (EC).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-1\MLR103.txt unknown Seq: 46  5-DEC-06 13:06
2006] REINING IN THE DATA TRADERS 185
be unaware that companies are collecting information about them or
about how that information will be used.  Many commentators have
focused on protecting data at the collection stage of the data flow,
advocating opt-in systems that force data traders to obtain consumer
consent to their information practices.242  Ideally, this system allows
consumers to choose from a menu of privacy options, which could
then be policed.  But a weakness of the consent-based approach is that
it does not require data traders to treat fairly the data they have al-
ready collected without the subject’s consent, or with consent to ex-
tremely unfair information practices.  Clearly, it would be unfair to
hold data traders liable now for previously creating a data profile; how-
ever, once an individual discovers that such a profile exists and ex-
presses her objection to it, the data trader would have to delete the
profile and cease any further aggregation or mining of that individ-
ual’s information.
One further objection to this standard of care is that it imposes a
mandatory assumption about privacy preferences, when individual
choice is integral to the very notion of privacy it imposes.243  However,
the critical mandate of the Fair Information Practices standard is that
individuals must have a meaningful choice about how their data is
used.  Only the choice itself is not waivable; individuals would still be
free to select greater or lesser privacy preferring options for the uses
of their data, or indicate a strong privacy preference for certain enti-
ties such as data brokers but allow for more information processing by
trusted businesses so that they can enjoy certain conveniences.  Thus,
for example, while an individual might choose not to permit Choice-
Point to aggregate or mine her personal information, she might per-
mit Amazon.com to do so because she enjoys receiving reading
suggestions.
242. E.g., McClurg, supra note 8, at 128–37; Cohen, supra note 20, at 1432–35 (defining R
consent for the purposes of accessing personally identifiable data).
243. See Kang, supra note 22, at 1266.  Professor Kang notes that “control is at the heart R
of information privacy,” and that “the state should hesitate to proscribe information flow
on some paternalistic theory.” Id.  He concedes, however, that paternalistic intervention
would be justified if the empirical data exists to show that Americans “systematically over-
value[ ]the short-term benefit of disclosing personal information . . . and undervalue[ ]
the long-term harm of detailed profiles.” Id. at 1266 n.301.
Professor Schwartz, operating on a property theory, would impose a limit on the free
alienability of data.  Schwartz, supra note 20, at 2097.  His property scheme limits the alien- R
ability and future uses of personal information, so that the individual’s property interest
“runs with the asset.” Id.
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D. Damages
The new tort protects the individual’s inherent right to control
her personal information, and thus would award damages based on
emotional loss, monetary loss, or both.
In past litigation, damages in privacy cases have been difficult to
prove or have been considered so minimal that the cases do not justify
the litigation expenses.244  The Restatement approach to damages for
privacy torts is based on the law of defamation: it allows for general
damages, which are not linked to any specific monetary harm, for the
harm to the privacy interest that was invaded and mental distress re-
sulting from the invasion,245 and special damages (actual, material, or
monetary losses) caused by the invasion.246  On paper, this approach
seems to be sufficiently flexible to redress the many varieties of injury
that may be caused by the misuse of personal information: financial
(the consequences of identity theft or price discrimination), emo-
tional (injury to dignity, seclusion, or reserve; mental distress), and a
combination of both (anxiety about identity theft that results in medi-
cal expenses).
Thus, returning to the four scenarios at the beginning of this Ar-
ticle, the woman frightened by the inmate, the man offended by unso-
licited advertisements, and the woman offended by learning about her
consumer profile would receive general damages compensating the
harm to their interest in controlling how their personal information is
used and any mental distress that resulted from the loss of control.
The law student could recover for his financial losses, the time spent
clearing up the identity theft, and mental distress.
For the damages to be effective—i.e., provide sufficient incentives
to force the data traders to reform their privacy practices—plaintiffs
must be able to bring class actions based on aggregates of harm.247
244. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 20, at 2108 (discussing the difficulty of proving actual R
damages in the privacy context, and noting that “an individual’s personal data may not
have a high enough market value to justify the costs of litigation”).
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621, § 652H cmt. b (1977).  Certain defama-
tion torts require proof of “special harm” of a material or pecuniary nature before general
damages can be awarded. Id. § 575 cmts. a & b.
246. Id. § 652H cmt. d.
247. Damages for harms to privacy interests are so difficult to quantify that even classes
of plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient injury.  For example, in the DoubleClick litigation,
the claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was dismissed because the plaintiffs
failed to allege losses of $5,000, the statutory minimum, to one or more individuals during
any one-year period. In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 523
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).  The court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8)(A) (2000) to permit plain-
tiffs to aggregate damages “across victims and over time for a single act” that violated the
statute, but not across all victims and all acts for any given year. Id.  More recently, how-
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The purpose of consumer class action lawsuits is to “aggregate[ ] nu-
merous small claims into one action,” thereby enhancing judicial effi-
ciency and access to the courts.248  Class action lawsuits arising from
violations of information privacy serve both the efficiency and access
goals.  But because the likely damages for even a successful suit for
misuse of personal information are small, individual plaintiffs are,
practically speaking, precluded from seeking a remedy without the
possibility of aggregating harm.249
Ideally, state or federal legislation250 would eventually impose a
scheme of damages similar to that in the copyright statute.251  Under
this type of scheme, the proof of misuse of personal information
would give rise to general or presumed damages, in a statutorily im-
posed range, if the defendant acted negligently.252  A higher range of
damages would be available if the data trader behaved willfully.253
The FCRA also provides a useful model for privacy remedies.  Under
the FCRA, individuals have a right of access to their credit reports, the
right to correct inaccurate information, the ability to opt out of
prescreened credit “opportunities,”254 and a private right of action
against CRAs with remedies including minimum damages, attorneys’
fees, and punitive damages.255
ever, the Eleventh Circuit held that the DPPA, which has a liquidated damages provision,
did not require proof of actual damages, and allowed a class action against a savings bank
that had illegally purchased motor vehicle records from the state to proceed.  Kehoe v. Fid.
Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1612
(2006).
248. Weld v. Glaxo Wellcome Inc., 746 N.E.2d 522, 532 (Mass. 2001).
249. Id.
250. Professor Froomkin argues that statutorily imposed damages schemes would create
a sufficient incentive for individuals to police the privacy policies of data traders.  Froom-
kin, supra note 25, at 1528.  Many privacy statutes include provisions for liquidated or mini- R
mum damages. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c)(2) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(2) (2000 &
Supp. 2006); 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2006).  The Privacy Act has a similar
provision, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2000 & Supp. 2006), but “plaintiffs must prove some
actual damages to qualify for a minimum statutory award of $1,000.”  Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S.
614, 616 (2004).
251. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2000 & Supp. 2006) (stating that a copyright infringer “is
liable for either (1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits . . . or
(2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c)”).
252. See id. § 504(c)(1) (providing a damages range of $750 to $30,000).
253. Id. § 504(c)(2) (permitting courts to increase statutory damages up to $150,000 for
willful copyright infringements).
254. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(e) (2000 & Supp. 2006).  One may opt out by going to https://
www.optoutprescreen.com (last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
255. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The development of sexual harassment law provides a useful his-
torical model for using a judge-made remedy to redress a social wrong
that the legislature has not—or will not—address.  Because the com-
mon law did not recognize sexual harassment as a cause of action,
prior to the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII),256 individuals used traditional common law actions such as
wrongful discharge, breach of contract, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, or intentional interference with contractual relations to
bring indirectly the types of claims that now can be brought directly
under Title VII.257  The common law thus preceded the public law,
acting as a “crowbar” for reform and accountability.  The traditional
common law claims ultimately were an imperfect fit with the particu-
lars of sexual harassment claims, but the precedent provided a useful
laboratory for the sweeping federal legislation to come and for its sub-
sequent interpretation.  Coming full circle, commentators are urging
now that the common law should recognize a tort of sexual
harassment.258
Admittedly, the judicial administration of a problem as pervasive
as information misuse could be a nightmare for the courts and data
traders.  But, for people whose information has been misused, the cur-
rent system—or non-system—is already a nightmare.259  There have
been enormous losses, both direct (the estimated cost of identity theft
in time and money and the psychological harm caused by loss of con-
trol over one’s identity) and indirect (the opportunity costs of people
avoiding electronic commerce because they fear identity theft or loss
of control over their personal information).  The data traders are cur-
rently free riding on the information of others because—except in
rare circumstances such as the ChoicePoint example—they do not
shoulder the full costs of their inaccuracies and security leaks.  In-
stead, individuals shoulder the burden, paying with their time, money,
256. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (2000).
257. See Sarah E. Wald, Alternatives to Title VII: State Statutory and Common-Law Remedies for
Employment Discrimination, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35, 44–59 (1982) (discussing common law
contract and tort claims available when Title VII and state antidiscrimination statutes are
unavailable); Christopher P. Barton, Note, Between the Boss and a Hard Place: A Consideration
of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson and the Law of Sexual Harassment, 67 B.U. L. REV.
445, 463 (1987) (noting that prior to the enactment of Title VII, as well as now, plaintiffs
may bring claims of sexual harassment under the traditional tort rubric).
258. E.g., Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm,
8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 362 (1990) (proposing a tort of sexual harassment that is based
on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress).
259. See “Who Am I?”, supra note 19 (detailing the difficulties of trying to clear one’s R
credit report after identity theft).
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and injuries to their choice and control.  It is not only fair, but also
logical, that the person who suffers the harm from information misuse
should have control of how her personal information is used.  It also
makes sound economic sense to create a viable protection for con-
sumer data privacy, as injured or fearful consumers will hesitate to
consume in ways that make them more vulnerable to information
abuse, forgoing Internet and other forms of electronic commerce.
Realistically, the data traders would not be helpless when faced by
classes of angry plaintiffs.  As in other areas of tort, data traders would
have the opportunity to develop mitigating defenses.  For example, a
data trader may have a viable defense when it followed Fair Informa-
tion Practices but was defrauded and consequently sold information
to someone not entitled to receive it, or when its highly secure
database is improbably hacked or compromised by a virus.  Further-
more, courts would probably develop a “cure” defense: the data
trader’s prompt “cure” of a problem, such as data inaccuracy, might
release it from liability for damages.  Additionally, individuals would
be expected to take responsibility for making their privacy prefer-
ences known and for keeping their personal information secure (a
contributory negligence or comparative fault defense).  Finally, insur-
ance companies already provide insurance against “data intrusion”;260
insurance against data misuse would surely develop.
The most positive effect of a new tort would be the creation of an
incentive for data traders to invest in better data security technologies
and to take seriously their obligation to use Fair Information Prac-
tices.261  A viable personal information tort would force data traders to
implement better systems of obtaining consumer consent to the col-
lection and use of their personal information.  After a few successful
lawsuits for the misuse of personal information, data traders would
realize that they must obtain consent for data processing, requiring
them to discover the privacy preferences of their data subjects and
motivating them to seek a self-imposed solution.
Ironically, a patchwork of common law tort regimes may have
data traders begging for comprehensive federal legislation.  Ulti-
mately, sweeping federal legislation will be the most effective way to
rein in the data traders, given the portability of data, the pervasiveness
of the current problems, and the inevitability that misuses will in-
crease as data technology grows ever more sophisticated.  However,
260. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 185, at 277–78 & n.143 (noting that insurance compa- R
nies are offering data intrusion policies).
261. See Froomkin, supra note 25, at 1528, 1540 (urging the creation of mechanisms to R
create incentives for the self-policing of privacy policies).
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even an imperfect common law claim may provide a small foothold on
a remedy for individuals who have been harmed but currently have no
recourse to redress that harm.  And, as the history of employment dis-
crimination litigation shows, that legislation will be better constructed
if it is built on the experience of the common law.
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APPENDIX 1
Fair Information Practices correlated with liability for misuse of
personal information
Fair Information Practices Tort of Misuse
NOTICE There must be no personal Data traders maintain secret
data record-keeping systems databases of information.
whose very existence is secret.
CHOICE There must be a way for an Data is combined, profiled,
individual to prevent analyzed, mined, rented, or
information about him sold without the consent of the
obtained for one purpose from data subject or in ways
being used or made available incompatible with original
for other purposes without his purpose.  Data trader continues
consent. to sell or process data after
individual has objected or
otherwise indicated her privacy
preferences
ACCESS There must be a way for an Data trader refuses to grant
individual to find out what access to files, fails to make
information about him is in a prompt corrections, or
record and how it is used. maintains inaccurate
There must be a way for an information.
individual to correct or amend
a record of identifiable
information about himself.
SECURITY Any organization creating, Data trader fails to implement
maintaining, using, or and maintain appropriate
disseminating records of technological measures to
identifiable personal data must protect data against accidental
assure the reliability of the data loss, unauthorized alteration,
for its intended use and must disclosure, access, or
take reasonable precautions to dissemination to persons with
prevent misuse of the data. no legitimate need for the data.
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Appendix 2
An expanded view of Fair Information Practices correlated with liability for misuse
Fair Information European Union Tort of Misuse
Practices & other Data Privacy
U.S. Laws Directive
95/46, 1995 O.J.
(L281) 32 (EC)
NOTICE There must be no Data traders main-
personal data record- tain secret databases
keeping systems of information.
whose very existence
is secret.
CHOICE There must be a Article 6(b): Data Data is combined,
means for an individ- should not be profiled, analyzed,
ual to prevent infor- processed in a way mined, rented, or
mation obtained incompatible with sold without the con-
about him for one the purposes for sent of the data sub-
purpose from being which it was col- ject or in ways
used or made availa- lected. incompatible with
ble for other pur- original purpose.
poses without his Article 7(a) and Data trader contin-
consent. 14(b): Data subject ues to sell or process
must unambiguously data after consumerFCRA, 15 U.S.C.
consent to the has objected or§ 1681b(e) (2000 &
processing of his opted out.Supp. 2006): con-
data, and be able tosumer must be able
object to datato “opt out” of
processing for theprescreened credit
use of direct market-opportunities
ing.
ACCESS There must be a Article 12: Data sub- Data trader refuses
means for an individ- ject must be able to to grant access to
ual to find out what access, demand cor- files, fails to make
information about rections, and block prompt corrections,
him is in a record the further process- maintains inaccurate
and how it is used. ing of data. or outdated informa-
There must be a way tion.
for an individual to Article 6(d): Data
correct or amend a should be complete,
record of identifiable accurate and, where
information about necessary, up to
himself. date.
SECURITY Any organization cre- Article 17: Data con- Data trader fails to
ating, maintaining, troller must imple- implement and
using, or disseminat- ment appropriate maintain appropriate
ing records of identi- technological mea- technological mea-
fiable personal data sures to protect data sures to protect data
must assure the relia- against accidental against accidental
bility of the data for loss and unautho- loss, unauthorized
its intended use and rized alteration, dis- alteration, disclosure,
must take reasonable closure, or access, access, or dissemina-
precautions to pre- especially if process- tion to persons with
vent misuse of the ing involves transmis- no legitimate need
data. sion over a network. for the data.
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OBSOLETE DATA FCRA, 15 U.S.C. Article 6(e): Data Data trader fails to
§ 1681c(a): CBAs should be kept in a purge information in
must purge adverse personally identify- appropriate and
credit information ing way for no timely manner.
more than seven longer than is neces-
years old. sary for the original
purposes or for fur-
ther processing.
CATEGORIES OF Equal Credit Oppor- Article 8: Certain Data trader
DATA THAT tunity Act, 15 U.S.C. data will not be processes, sells, or
RAISE CON- § 1691 (2000): pro- processed: racial or otherwise trades or
CERNS ABOUT hibits credit discrimi- ethnic origin, politi- exchanges informa-
DISCRIMINATION nation on basis of cal opinion, religious tion about race,
race, color, religion, or philosophical color, religion,
national origin, sex, beliefs, trade union national origin, sex,
marital status, wel- membership, health, marital status, wel-
fare payments, or or sex life. fare payments, or
age. age.
PROTECTION OF Children’s Online Data trader collects
CHILDREN Privacy Protection any information
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 from or about chil-
(2000): limits collec- dren.
tion and further use
of information col-
lected about chil-
dren.
